University of Tennessee, Knoxville

TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Doctoral Dissertations

Graduate School

5-2017

Implicit Taxes in Imperfect Markets
Hannah Elizabeth Smith
University of Tennessee, Knoxville, hsmith25@vols.utk.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons

Recommended Citation
Smith, Hannah Elizabeth, "Implicit Taxes in Imperfect Markets. " PhD diss., University of Tennessee, 2017.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/4499

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee
Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact
trace@utk.edu.

To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Hannah Elizabeth Smith entitled "Implicit
Taxes in Imperfect Markets." I have examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for
form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Business Administration.
LeAnn Luna, Major Professor
We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance:
Dan Murphy, James Chyz, Don Bruce
Accepted for the Council:
Dixie L. Thompson
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)

Implicit Taxes in Imperfect Markets

A Dissertation Presented for the
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Hannah Elizabeth Smith
May 2017

Abstract
Implicit taxes are defined as the pre-tax rate of return disadvantage earned on an investment that
is taxed preferentially. Implicit tax theory predicts that implicit taxes will fully offset any benefit
from preferential tax treatment leading to no benefit from lower explicit taxes; however, implicit
tax theory assumes perfect market competition. This paper relaxes the assumption of perfect
market competition and finds that firms in industries with lower competition bear lower implicit
taxes, and firms in industries with higher competition bear higher implicit taxes. These findings
are consistent with firms in industries with less competition having price setting power. Further,
these findings are consistent with competition forcing firms in high competition industries to
pass along tax savings to customers while firms in low competition industries can retain more of
their tax savings. These findings further answer the call in the literature for more research on
determinants of cross-sectional variation in implicit taxes (Shackelford and Shevlin 2001).
KEYWORDS: corporate taxation, corporate tax rates, implicit taxes, corporate tax preferences,
cost advantage, market concentration
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Section I: Introduction
U.S tax law provides firms with tax preferences through reduced tax rates, tax credits, higher
and earlier deductions, delayed income recognition, exemptions, etc. (Scholes et al. 2015). All
else equal, this will encourage firms to increase investment in tax preferred areas, thus increasing
the supply of outputs. In a perfectly competitive market this increase in output supply will drive
down output price and reduce the rate of return in tax preferred areas (Jennings et al. 2012).
Implicit tax theory holds that investment continues to increase in these tax preferred areas until
there is no after tax rate of return difference between investing in a tax preferred versus non-tax
preferred area (Nicholson 2005). This reduced pre-tax rate of return on an investment that is taxed
preferentially is the implicit tax (Scholes et al. 2015). Using a large sample of U.S. firms, I seek to
document whether variation in market competition impacts implicit tax formation. My work
complements prior research that examines variation in explicit taxes (i.e. effective tax rates)
(Hanlon and Heitzman 2010) and answers the call from Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) and
Scholes et al. (2015) for more research that considers firms’ entire tax burdens – both implicit and
explicit. Because most existing tax research focuses only on firms’ explicit tax burdens and has
not attempted to measure and include implicit taxes in the analyses, the findings from these studies
present a potentially incomplete picture of US corporations’ tax burdens (Hanlon and Heitzman
2010).
Markets lie along a spectrum that ranges from perfectly competitive to monopolistic
(Nicholson 2005). Economic theory suggests that in perfectly competitive markets implicit taxes
will rise to fully offset any benefit from reducing explicit taxes (Scholes et al. 2015). Similarly,
theory predicts that in monopolistic settings implicit taxes may be closer to zero and firms may
retain more of their explicit tax preferences. However, in the U.S. economy monopolies or perfect
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competition are unlikely to hold and in reality, most firms participate in markets that lie somewhere
between these two extremes. Firms can face competition on the input side on what they purchase
to produce their goods or services or on the supply side on what they sell to customers. Consistent
with prior research (e.g., Kubick et al. 2015 and Chyz, Gaertner, and Laplante 2014), I focus on
the supply side in this paper because measurement of competition on the supply side is much more
straightforward. Kubick et al. (2015) and Chyz, Gaertner, and Laplante (2014) similarly focus on
the supply side and both find results that they attribute to competitive market forces. Specifically,
Kubick et al. (2015) finds that firms with higher product market power (i.e., less competition)
engage in more tax avoidance, and Chyz et al. (2014) find that firms selling products with less
elastic demand (i.e., potentially less competition) avoid more taxes than firms with more elastic
demand. Similar to this paper, both of these papers focus on the supply side (the output side of
what firms are producing and/or selling).
However, the competitiveness of the firms’ input side could influence my results. There is
reason to believe that the competitiveness of the input side for firms is similar to the demand side.
If firms sell goods in a competitive market, then they are likely competing over the same inputs to
production. In Appendix 2, in Figures 2 and 4, I show the effect on the price of goods if the supply
increases under perfect competition and in a monopoly, respectively. In both instances, price
decreases; however, the level of price decreases may be different between the two scenarios.
Without controlling for the competitiveness of the demand of the inputs, interpretation of my
results may be limited. On the demand side, Appendix 2, Figures 1 and 5 demonstrate the effect
of an increase in demand under perfect competition or in a monopoly situation. In both situations
a price increase occurs, but the degree of increase may differ between the two scenarios.
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Prior research suggests that implicit taxes are generally not as high as would be expected in a
perfectly competitive market (e.g., Ayers et al. 2000, Berger 1993, Engel et al. 1999, Erickson and
Wang 1999, Guenther 1994, Henning and Shaw 2000, Miller 1977, Shackelford 1991, Stickney et
al. 1983, Key 2008). Whether the findings from this prior research can be explained by measurable
and predictable deviations from perfect market competition is an empirical question. To answer
this question, I estimate market competition at the NAICS industry level using market
concentration ratios of the top four firms and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) (Callihan and
White 1999). I then modify and extend the methodology developed in Jennings et al. (2012) to
test variation in implicit tax differences arising from industry level competition. I provide detail
of these tests in Section III.
I find that implicit taxes are lower for firms in industries with lower competition and higher in
industries with higher competition as predicted by theory.

Firms in industries with low

competition (closer on the spectrum to a monopoly) appear to be able to retain some of the tax
preference benefits whereas firms in industries that are more competitive have more of their
explicit tax preference benefits eliminated by implicit taxes.
There are other reasons why prices would not fully respond to changes in supply including
externalities, public goods, and imperfect information (Nicholson 2005). I focus on imperfect
competition for several reasons. Competition can be reliably measured using several generally
accepted measures. Further, competition can be measured for all industries unlike externalities
and public goods, which may only be an issue for certain industries.
My findings should be of interest to managers, researchers, and tax policy makers. The
accounting and finance literatures typically characterize firms’ tax outcomes as reflecting a
strategic focus or “investment” in tax minimization or tax planning (Mills et al. 1998). In other
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words, managers expend resources to minimize taxes (Chyz et al., 2016a, Chyz et al., 2014). My
results show that increased market competition will offset some of the benefits from paying lower
explicit taxes. The results may help explain the “undersheltering puzzle” visited in prior literature
– i.e., why more tax avoidance does not occur (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Weisbach 2001).
Finally, my results inform tax policy by documenting sources of variation in implicit taxes. The
existence of implicit taxes can provide a signal to policy makers that legislated tax preferences
effectively incentivized a targeted area. At the same time policy makers will want to predict
whether legislated tax preferences could lead to changes in firms’ total tax burdens.1
The remainder of my paper is structured as follows. Section II discusses prior research and
develops my hypothesis. Section III outlines my sample selection procedures, variable definitions,
and research methodology. Section IV discusses some additional tests. I conclude in Section V.

1

In future research, it would be interesting to examine rifle-shot provisions and implicit taxes. I would expect that
rifle-shot provisions that lower explicit taxes that impact a single firm (or small number of firms) rather than an
entire industry would be less subject to offsets in benefits in the form of implicit taxes than tax policies that impact
an entire industry or large group of firms.
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Section II: Prior Research and Hypothesis Development
a. What do we know about explicit and implicit taxes?
The literature regarding explicit U.S. corporate tax burdens is extensive and well
developed. For example, prior literature finds a number of determinants of explicit taxes including
firm size, capital structure, asset mix, profitability, international operations, tax shelter usage,
compensation on pre-tax versus post-tax income, equity-based compensation, concentration of
ownership, whether the tax department is a profit center, tax director compensation contracts, and
top executive characteristics (Armstrong et al. 2012; Chen et al. 2010; Desai and Dharmapala
2006; Dyreng et al. 2010; Gupta and Newberry 1997; Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Phillips 2003;
Rego 2003; Robinson et al. 2010; Zimmerman 1983). However, this prior literature generally
estimates tax burdens without directly measuring implicit taxes.
Implicit taxes arise as reductions in the benefits of explicit tax preferences. First, capital
is attracted to tax-favored investments (or projects with lower explicit tax rates). As companies
invest more and more capital in these tax favored projects, the supply curve shifts to the right (see
Appendix 2 for an illustration). Eventually, in a perfectly competitive market, risk adjusted after
tax rates of return will equalize among differentially taxed projects or firms (Jennings et al. 2012).
Implicit taxes are thus the pre-tax return disadvantage that equalizes after tax rates of return.
Implicit tax theory predicts that implicit taxes will fully offset explicit tax benefits leading to no
benefit from investing in tax advantaged projects. This can also be looked at as a total tax burden
story where in a perfectly competitive economy, the total tax burden, calculated as the sum of
explicit and implicit taxes, is the same across projects and across firms (Callihan and White 1999).
However, prior research suggests that the total tax burden varies and implicit taxes do not always
fully offset explicit tax benefits (Wilkie 1992; Jennings et al. 2012).
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Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) and Scholes et al. (2014) remind researchers and policy
makers to consider “all taxes” in our analyses and that ignoring implicit taxes leaves a gap in our
understanding. Prior research in implicit taxes measures implicit taxes at an aggregated asset level
or at a firm level. Implicit taxes at the asset level are easier to conceptualize relative to implicit
taxes at a firm level. Consider for example the case of municipal bonds. Interest from municipal
bonds is generally not taxed to an investor, while interest from corporate bonds of comparable risk
are subject to investor level taxation. However, one would expect differences in taxation to be
reflected in the pre-tax rates of return. One would expect corporate bonds to have higher pre-tax
returns than municipal bonds of comparable risk. One would also expect equal after tax rates of
return between municipal and corporate bonds of comparable risk in a perfectly competitive
economy. The lower pre-tax rate of return for tax favored municipal bonds is the implicit tax.
The ease of interpretation is likely to explain why much of the prior literature on implicit
taxes has measured or examined variation in implicit taxes at an asset level (Ayers et al. 2000;
Berger 1993; Engel et al. 1999; Erickson and Wang 1999; Guenther 1994; Henning and Shaw
2000; Miller 1977; Shackelford 1991; Stickney et al. 1983, Key 2008). Though a simplified
interpretation, if we consider firms to be collections of investments made (assets purchased) and
returns received then much of the same theory and logic that assists with understanding implicit
taxes at the asset level can be extended to capture implicit taxes at the firm level. There are distinct
advantages with attempting to capture implicit taxes at the firm level. Measuring implicit taxes at
the firm level allows for better comparisons with much of the extant explicit tax literature that also
uses firm level measures (Callihan and White 1999, Chyz et al. 2016b; Jennings et al. 2012;
Salbador and Vendrzyk 2006; Markle et al. 2016). Prior research at the firm level finds that full
implicit tax formation is impacted by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) (Jennings et al. 2012),
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market power within niche industries or investments (Salbador and Vendrzyk 2006; Shackelford
1991; Stickney et al. 1983), aggressive tax planning (Jennings et al. 2012), tax shelter use (Jennings
et al. 2012), multinational operations (Chyz et al. 2016b), and ability to shift income (Markle et al.
2016).
Miller (1977) discusses, among many things, the implicit taxes borne by holders of taxpreferred versus fully taxable corporate bonds. Stickney et al. (1983) examines a specific company
– General Electric and subsidiaries – and finds evidence of implicit taxes on the tax preference
benefits of tax transfer leasing. Shackelford (1991) studies a unique setting involving employee
stock ownership plans (ESOPs) and finds that tax preferences for ESOPs incur implicit taxes.
Berger (1993) investigates implicit taxes related to the 1981 Research and Development (R&D)
tax credit and finds evidence of implicit taxes by isolating the impact of spending increases for
R&D related to price increases (input price increases would be evidence of implicit taxes) versus
volume increases. Guenther (1994) finds evidence of implicit taxes on treasury bills by comparing
pre-tax returns of treasury bills around the rate changes (i.e. December versus January). Engel et
al. (1999) find support for small but lower than theory predicts levels of implicit taxes for trust
preferred stock by examining the rate of return investors were willing to accept for financial
instruments identical except for the taxability of the interest/dividends. Erickson and Wang (1999)
find evidence of implicit taxes in a specific transaction between two firms in which huge tax
savings were achieved for one party; however, evidence of implicit taxes shows that at least a
portion of the benefits were transferred to the other party via lower stock transfer prices. Ayers
et al. (2000) analyzes the goodwill amortization deduction enactment and finds support that this
tax preference (goodwill amortization deduction) generated implicit taxes by analyzing the relation
between pre-existing goodwill and acquisition premiums before and after the enactment of the act
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allowing the deduction of goodwill amortization from qualifying corporate acquisitions. Henning
and Shaw (2000) examine changes around the tax deductibility of goodwill and find evidence of
implicit taxes for this tax preference. Key (2008) examines implicit taxes for a unique sample of
racehorse purchases where some are allowed bonus depreciation and finds evidence of implicit
taxes but below the level theory predicts.
My paper builds upon this asset-level and firm-level research and will contribute to this
literature stream by examining on a large scale one very important determinant of implicit taxes:
market competitiveness.
The two papers most related to this study are Salbador and Vendrzyk (2006) and Callihan
and White (1999). Callihan and White (1999) it is determined in Wright (2001) actually measures
tax preferences rather than implicit taxes. And thus, their findings essentially can be interpreted
as firms in more competitive industries have higher tax preferences. In my delta analysis test, I
control for tax preferences and measure implicit taxes as the reduction in the benefit of the explicit
tax preferences. This approach effectively controls for tax preferences. I leave it to future research
to determine the interactive effect of tax preferences, implicit taxes, and competition. Salbador
and Vendrzyk (2006) look at a niche industry – the defense contracting industry – and make
assertions based on market power within this niche industry. Their results are limited to the
particular industry, whereas my results are potentially more generalizable across a population.
A discussion of implicit taxes is incomplete without a short discussion of tax incidence.
Tax incidence relates to who bears the tax. For explicit taxes, if an increase in explicit taxes can
be passed through to a firm’s customers through higher sales prices, then the customer bears the
increased explicit taxes. Theoretical tax incidence literature generally determines that corporate
tax incidence falls on the less mobile input factors, generally labor and services or capital (when

8

mobility of capital varies) (Harberger 2008; Gravelle 2008). Researchers typically examine tax
incidence at an economy level and examine which groups bear the tax overall. While the incidence
literature does not address implicit taxes directly, evidence in the incidence literature suggests that
changes in economy-wide explicit taxes are borne to some extent by suppliers, employees, and
customers and not just shareholders. This supports the notion that changes in implicit taxes offset
at least some of the changes in explicit taxes (Jennings et al. 2012). The incidence of an explicit
tax change can be borne by the firm itself or the input or output factors of the firm (i.e., suppliers
and customers). Prior literature suggests that firms may take into account their ability (or inability)
to pass on tax savings or costs to other parties when making investments into tax avoidance (Chyz
et al. 2014). Although it complements and helps clarify implicit tax research, incidence is not the
focus of this paper and is left for future research.
As discussed, implicit tax theory predicts equal total tax burdens (calculated as the sum of
explicit and implicit taxes) across firms (Callihan and White 1999). In other words, implicit taxes
should fully offset any benefit from lowering explicit taxes. While prior literature has found
evidence that rejects implicit taxes fully offsetting all explicit tax preference benefits and total tax
burdens not being perfectly equal across all firms, evidence supports the existence of varying
degrees of implicit taxes (Jennings et al. 2012; Callihan and White 1999; Wilkie 1992). The
general framework holds that the more a market diverges from being perfectly competitive (via
lower market competitiveness), the more likely implicit taxes do not fully offset explicit tax
benefits, as would be expected in a perfectly competitive market. Measuring market power as
industry market concentration and a firm’s market share, Callihan and White (1999) find evidence
that the use of tax preferences varies with market competition.2 Further, Salbador and Vendrzyk

2

Callihan and White (1999) make claims regarding how implicit taxes vary with competition; however, Wright
(2001) proves that their methodology was actually measuring tax preferences and not implicit taxes.
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(2006) find that in a very small industry, ability to set prices (i.e., more monopolistic) reduces
implicit taxes at the firm level. How market competition impacts the degree of implicit tax
formation has not been examined in the literature. My research fills this gap by examining market
competition’s impact on implicit tax formation, which is a natural test as implicit tax theory relies
on the assumption of perfect competition.
b. Hypothesis Development
Implicit taxes arise due to increased demand or supply for a tax preferred asset or
investment. From the supply side, suppose Congress allows for 50 percent immediate expensing
on the purchase of equipment through bonus depreciation thus creating a tax preference. Due to
this tax preference, firms purchase more equipment driving up supply of whatever they are
producing. This leads to lower selling prices for the firms output, leading to lower pre-tax returns.
This is the supply effect. Appendix 2, Figure 2 shows this scenario. In a perfectly competitive
market, as the supply in the particular industry increases and shifts the supply curve to the right,
the equilibrium point shifts driving the output price down on the outputs in the industry (Nicholson
2005). Supply increases in the industry and shifts the output price down to the point at which the
equilibrium price equals the average cost in the industry, leading to zero profits (or no benefit for
investing in the tax preferred item, i.e., equipment in this example) (Nicholson 2005). On the flip
side, suppose this bonus depreciation is limited to a single firm that operates as a monopoly. In a
monopoly, a firm operates at the point at which marginal revenue equals marginal cost (Nicholson
2005; Chamberlin 1933). Figures 3 and 4 show the monopoly supply scenario. A tax preference
for the firm operating in a monopoly shifts the marginal cost curve down, leading to a change in
the equilibrium intersection of marginal cost and marginal revenue (Nicholson 2005; Chamberlin
1933). This generally leads to an increase in quantity produced and in price. However, monopolies

10

can earn a positive profit as profit = (price – average cost)*quantity, where price is greater than or
equal to average cost. If a firm operates in a monopoly, the firm is not forced to shift the entire
benefit of the tax preference (via lower pre-tax return, in this case lower price) to the customers as
is the case in a perfectly competitive market (Nicholson 2005). Figure 3 shows an example of how
a monopoly chooses the point at which to produce (where marginal cost (MC) equals marginal
revenue (MR)), and Figure 4 shows how this looks on a traditional supply and demand graph.
Figure 5 shows the effect on price if the supplier operates in a monopoly and demand increases.
In this case, supply produced does not change, and thus price is driven up. As the focus in this
paper is on the supply curve, Figures 2 and 4 are most relevant.
Even though implicit tax theory suggests that I will find implicit taxes increasing in
competition, I may not find results in my sample if all industries in my sample are competitive
enough to cause implicit taxes to form. The Federal Trade Commission is tasked with the job of
identifying and breaking up monopolies that exist that exhibit unfair trade practices such as price
fixing (Averitt 1980). Therefore, industries in the United States may not vary enough in their
competitiveness for identification of a relation between implicit taxes and competition.
Implicit tax theory implies that implicit taxes arise in the presence of tax preferences to
fully offset the benefits of explicit tax preferences (Callihan and White 1999). Implicit tax theory
assumes perfect competition. In a non-perfectly competitive market, implicit taxes may not fully
offset the benefits of tax preferences leading to lower implicit taxes than would be expected in a
perfectly competitive market (Callihan and White 1999). This theory leads to my hypothesis:
Hypothesis: Firms in industries with lower competition bear lower implicit taxes than
firms in industries with higher competition.
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Section III: Sample Selection Procedures, Variable Definitions, and Research Methodology
a. Sample Selection Procedures
I begin with all U.S. firms with available data in Compustat in the years 2002, 2007, and
2012. I use these three years because I require Census data to calculate my variables of interest,
and the Census data is only produced every 5 years. I use the Census data to determine total
industry sales within an industry. Compustat data captures only the public firms, and prior
literature has suggested that this data biases results when measuring competition (Ali, Klasa, and
Yeung 2009).3 Further, I require return on equity (ROE) to be not greater than one nor less than
zero, positive tax expense, positive pre-tax income, and positive stockholders’ equity. I further
require total assets of at least $10 million and pre-tax income of at least $500,000. My sample is
further reduced by requiring Census industry level data.4 I impose these requirements following
Jennings et al. (2012) as these requirements increase the likelihood that low effective tax rates
found in the sample are due to tax preferences from profitable firms as opposed to current year
losses or low profits. The return on equity requirement removes outliers that are likely due to
extreme situations or incorrect data. This results in 7,687 firm-year observations for my main
tests.5 Table 1 shows the effect each requirement has on the sample size. At the two digit NAICS
level, this results in 21 industries represented in the sample with firm-year observations per
industry ranging from 28 observations to 1,626 observations.6 This breakdown by industry is
shown in Table 2.

3

Ali et al. (2009) find that many prior studies that use Compustat based industry measures cannot be confirmed
using Census based industry measures.
4
For my main sample, I require firms to merge at the 2 digit NAICS level with the census data.
5
My main results hold if firms with NOL carryforwards are excluded. Excluding firms with NOL carryforwards
results in a sample of 5,376 firms.
6
I use the NAICS industry sales total from the Census data as this includes all firms and not just public firms. My
main results hold if I use the 3 digit NAICS instead of the 2 digit NAICS.

12

b. Variable Definitions, Research Methodology, and Results
I use a modified and expanded version of the research methodology from Jennings et al. 2012.
Using four main tests, I examine implicit taxes for firms in industries with low and high
competition. I define competition by using Callihan and White’s (1999) concentration ratio and
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). The concentration ratio (CR4) is defined as the total
revenue for the top four firms by two digit NAICS7, divided by the total sales for the industry
(Callihan and White 1999). The HHI is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm and
summing across two digit NAICS. The concentration ratio and the HHI capture whether an
industry is dominated by a few large players. The higher the concentration ratio or HHI, the more
an industry is dominated by a few large players and thus the more imperfect the market is (closer
on the spectrum to a monopoly). Higher concentration ratios or HHI indicate less competition in
an industry, and lower concentration ratios or HHI indicate more competition in an industry. The
other main variables of interest are GAAP effective tax rate (GAAP_ETR defined as tax expense
divided by pre-tax income), return on equity (ROE defined as net income divided by beginning of
year shareholders’ equity), and pretax return on equity (PTROE defined as pretax income divided
by beginning of year shareholders’ equity). The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 3 and are
shown for all firm-years.8 Panel A of Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for all firms-years in the
sample, and Panels B and C show the descriptive statistics for firm-years in industries with high
and low competition, respectively as defined by HIGH_CR4=0 and HIGH_CR4=1, respectively.
In panel A, I show that the average GAAP effective tax rate (GAAP_ETR) for the sample is

7

I use the historical NAICS throughout and for simplicity refer only to NAICS (as opposed to NAICSH).
PTROE, TAX, GAAP_ETR, ROE, TOTAL ASSETS, LEVERAGE, CAP, INV, and RD are winsorized at 1
percent and 99 percent. My main results hold if these variables are not winsorized. My results further hold if I
exclude NOL carryforward firm-years and do not winsorize. Leone et al. (2015) show winsorizing may bias some
results. My results do not appear to be biased due to winsorizing.
8
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0.3210, the average return on equity (ROE) is 0.1556, and the average pre-tax return on equity
(PTROE) is 0.2312. Variables are defined in Appendix 1.
i. High v. Low Tax Preference Groups
In my first set of tests, I examine firms in industries with high and low competition as measured
by concentration ratios and HHI below and above the median. Within each group, I compare the
firms with high (low) and low (high) tax preferences (GAAP ETRs). I define PTROE as pretax
income divided by shareholders’ equity and TAX as tax expense divided by shareholders’ equity.
TAX as defined here represents the reduction in after tax return on equity due to explicit taxes
(Jennings et al. 2012). In Table 4, Panel A, I first divide the sample into low competition (high
CR4, ≥ median CR4 by year) and high competition (low CR4, < median CR4 by year). I further
divide each subsample into high-tax and low-tax groups. The high-tax group represents the firms
in each subsample by year that have the highest 40 percent of the GAAP_ETR distribution (lowest
tax preferences), while the low-tax group represents the firms in each subsample by year that have
the lowest 40 percent of the GAAP_ETR distribution (high tax preferences). I then take the
differences in PTROE and TAX by high- and low-tax for each subsample (high and low
competition). I am looking for whether as a group firms in high and low competition groups have
differences, on average, in how much of their explicit tax advantage is offset by a pre-tax return
disadvantage. If firms in less competitive industries bear lower implicit taxes than firms in more
competitive industries, I will find a higher portion of the explicit tax benefit for firms in high
competition industries is offset by a pre-tax return disadvantage than for firms in low competition
industries.
For the low competition (CR4) subsample, I find that the TAX difference is 0.0455, which
indicates that firms in the low-tax group have a 4.55 percent after tax return advantage to firms in
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the high-tax group by paying lower GAAP_ETRs. If implicit tax theory holds, I should see an
offsetting PTROE reduction for firms in the low-tax group. For the low competition (CR4)
subsample, I find that high-tax firms have only a 2.04 percent pre-tax return advantage to firms in
the low-tax group. The ratio of the PTROE and TAX differences for the low competition industry
(CR4) firms of 44.84 percent indicates that firms in the low-tax industries can reduce their taxes
and only incur an offsetting pre-tax return disadvantage of around 44.84 percent of the explicit tax
savings. This is inconsistent with perfect implicit tax theory that suggests implicit taxes will
through a pre-tax return disadvantage offset the entire benefit of lowering explicit taxes.
For the second subsample in Table 4, Panel A, I find that for firms in industries that are more
competitive with low CR4, over 100 percent of the explicit tax benefits of low-tax firms are offset
by a pre-tax return disadvantage on average. I specifically find that 129.76 percent of the explicit
tax benefit (the 0.0562 difference in TAX between the high and low tax groups for high
competition firms) is offset by a pre-tax return disadvantage (a disadvantage of 0.0729, which is
the difference in PTROE between the high and low tax groups in the low CR4/ high competition
column). There are several potential explanations for why this value is over 100 percent. In a
perfect market, I would expect this value to be no more than 100 percent, which would indicate
that 100 percent of the explicit tax benefits are eliminated via implicit taxes through pre-tax return
reductions. One reason this value could be over 100 percent is that the measure is noisy. As I am
trying to capture variation between the two groups (high and low competition), I am not concerned
with noise influencing my inferences here because I have no reason to suspect that one group is
influenced more or less than the other by noise. Another possible reason for this over 100 percent
value could be that firms are overreacting and expending excess resources to lower their taxes. If
this is true, some firms may be working to lower their explicit taxes to the detriment of their pre-

15

tax return leading to lower after tax profits, and if this is the case these firms may be better served
to expending less resources to lowering explicit taxes. Overreaction and non-optimal tax related
decisions has been documented in other literature, particularly the economics literature (Chetty,
Looney, and Kroft 2009; Goldin and Homonoff 2013).
In Panel B, I substitute HHI for CR4 and find consistent results. Specifically, I find that for
firms in low competition industries, approximately 34.44 percent of the explicit tax benefit for low
tax firms is offset by a pre-tax return disadvantage (or implicit tax). And firms in high competition
industries bear an offsetting pre-tax return disadvantage of 130.30 percent. Thus, for this first test,
I find support that firms in industries with less competition exhibit an ability to bear lower implicit
taxes.
ii. Correlations
Next I examine correlations between both PTROE and GAAP_ETR as well as between
GAAP_ETR and ROE for firms in industries with high and low industry competition (based on
CR4 and HHI).
Implicit tax theory holds that any benefit from lowering explicit taxes is eliminated via a pretax rate of return reduction leading to equal after tax rates of return regardless of explicit taxes paid
(Scholes et al. 2015). Thus I expect to find PTROE and GAAP_ETR positively correlated as any
decrease in GAAP_ETR would be related to a corresponding PTROE decrease for firms in
industries with high competition and less positive or no correlation for firms in industries with low
competition. Further, in a perfectly competitive market, I expect to find no relation between after
tax return (ROE) and GAAP_ETR as any reductions in GAAP_ETR result in an offsetting pre-tax
return reduction leading to no effect on after tax return (ROE). However, a negative relation
between ROE and GAAP_ETR indicates an ability to retain explicit tax benefits as a reduction in
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GAAP_ETR results in an increase in after tax return (ROE). I expect to find a more negative
relation between GAAP_ETR and ROE for firms in industries with low competition.
In Table 5, Panel A, I find that there is no significant correlation between PTROE and
GAAP_ETR for firms in low competition industries (high CR4), and I find that there is a
significant positive correlation between PTROE and GAAP_ETR for firms in high competition
industries (low CR4). And this difference is statistically significant using 2-tailed tests at the 1
percent or better level. This suggests that firms in high competition industries have a pre-tax return
reduction when explicit taxes are lowered. And for firms in low competition industries, this pretax return disadvantage may not exist. In other words, firms may be able to lower explicit taxes
without incurring implicit taxes in the form of lower pre-tax rates of return. Further, I find a
negative and significant correlation between ROE and GAAP_ETR for both high competition and
low competition (CR4) subsamples. However, I find that the correlation is significantly more
negative for firms in low competition industries (high CR4). This suggests that firms in less
competitive industries can retain benefits from lowering explicit taxes to a greater degree than
firms in more competitive industries.
In Table 5, Panel B, I instead use HHI to divide my sample into high low and high competition
subsamples, and I find consistent results.
iii. Regressions
The regressions in Table 6 follow the same theory and logic from my univariate correlation
tests. However, in a regression I can examine correlations between GAAP_ETR and PTROE as
well as GAAP_ETR and ROE conditional on covariates thought to predict variation in the
GAAP_ETR. I control for size (LOG_ASSETS), leverage (LEVERAGE), capital intensity (CAP),
inventory intensity (INV), research and development intensity (RD), and foreign operations
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(MNE) (Jennings et al. 2012, Chyz et al. 2016b). Model 1 below corresponds to columns (1) and
(2) in Table 6 Panel A, and Model 2 below corresponds to results in columns (3) and (4) in Table
6 Panel B. For both models (1) and (2), subscripts i, y, and n denote firm, year, and NAICS (2
digit) industry, respectively. The high competition variable (HIGH_COMPVAR) is measured by
the concentration ratio (CR4) in columns (1) and (3) and by HHI in columns (2) and (4) in Table
6.
𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃_𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑛,𝑦 +
𝛽3 𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑦 𝑥𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑛,𝑦 + 𝛽4 𝐿𝑂𝐺_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽5 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑦 +
𝛽7 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑦 +𝛽8 𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽9 𝑀𝑁𝐸𝑖,𝑦 + ∑ 𝛽 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑦 + 𝜀

(1)

𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃_𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑛,𝑦 +
𝛽3 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑦 𝑥𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑛,𝑦 + 𝛽4 𝐿𝑂𝐺_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽5 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑦 +
𝛽7 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑦 +𝛽8 𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽9 𝑀𝑁𝐸𝑖,𝑦 + ∑ 𝛽 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑦 + 𝜀

In

these

regressions,

significance

of

the

(2)

coefficients

on

the

interaction

terms

PTROExHIGH_COMPVAR and ROExHIGH_COMPVAR (𝛽3) indicates firms in industries with
high and low competition have different PTROE, GAAP_ETR and ROE, GAAP_ETR relations
after controlling for size, leverage, capital intensity, inventory intensity, research and development
intensity, and multinational operations. If implicit taxes are different between firms operating in
industries characterized by relatively high or low competition, then I expect to find a negative
coefficient on the interaction term (PTROExHIGH_COMPVAR) (𝛽3 ) in model (1) and no
significance or weaker significance on the joint test for PTROE+PTROExHIGH_COMPVAR
(𝛽1 + 𝛽3). No significance on the joint test would suggest that firms in industries with low
competition (HIGH_COMPVAR=1) get no offsetting pre-tax return reduction from lowering
18

explicit taxes. A negative coefficient on this interaction would suggest firms in industries with
less competition (HIGH_COMPVAR=1, low competition) have lower GAAP_ETR, PTROE
relations than firms in industries with high competition. As discussed in the correlation tests
section, implicit tax theory predicts a pre-tax return (PTROE) reduction to offset the benefit from
lowering explicit taxes (GAAP_ETR). Thus, a negative coefficient on the interaction term in
columns (1) and (2) suggests that firms in industries with low competition bear lower implicit
taxes.
My results are consistent with my hypothesis that firms in industries with low competition
bear lower implicit taxes than firms in industries with higher competition. Specifically, in Table
6 Panel A, I show that for firms in industries with low competition as measured by HIGH_CR4=1,
the coefficient on the interaction term (PTROExHIGH_CR4) is -0.0341 (and is significant at the
5 percent or better level), and for firms in industries with low competition as measured by
HIGH_HHI=1, the coefficient on the interaction term (PTROExHIGH_HHI) is -0.0339 (and is
significant at the 5 percent or better level). This indicates that after controlling for a variety of
determinants of implicit taxes, firms in industries with lower competition (high CR4 or HHI) have
lower relations between PTROE and ETR, which suggests lower implicit taxes.9,10,11 Additionally,

9

In a joint test on the coefficients for PTROE, HIGH_COMPVAR, and PTROExHIGH_COMPVAR, I find that the
relation for the overall sample between PTROE and GAAP_ETR is significantly different than zero at the 1 percent
or better level.
10
In a joint test on the coefficients PTROE+PTROExHIGH_COMPVAR, I find no significance. This suggests no
relation between PTROE and GAAP_ETR for firms in industries with high values of CR4 (HHI), which supports
the idea that firms in less competitive industries bear lower implicit taxes.
11
In untabulated tests, I test whether the results here are robust to using firm fixed effects. The results for this
regression are not robust to using firm fixed effects. This may be due to the small number of firm observations.
2,268 firms in the sample have one observation, 1,304 have two observations, and 1,874 have three observations.
Firm fixed effects remove the entire effect that the regression is trying to capture for 2,268 firms and potentially a
large portion of the effect for the remaining firms in the sample.
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coefficients on control variables are generally consistent with prior literature except for capital
intensity (CAP) (Jennings et al. 2012, Chyz et al. 2016b).12
In model (2) (results shown in Panel B of Table 6), I examine the relation between
GAAP_ETR and ROE for firms in industries with high and low competition. As noted previously,
a finding of no relation between explicit taxes (GAAP_ETR) and after tax return (ROE) would
suggest implicit taxes are fully offsetting any explicit tax benefit as there is no after-tax return
(ROE) increase for lowering explicit taxes (GAAP_ETR). A negative relation between the two
would suggest firms can keep at least some of the benefit from lowering explicit taxes
(GAAP_ETR), and the more negative the relation, the more benefit is being retained and thus the
lower the implicit taxes.
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 Panel B, I find that the coefficient on the interaction term
ROExHIGH_CR4 is -0.0794 (and is significant at the 1 percent level or better), and ROExHIGH_
HHI is -0.0820 (and is also significant at the 1 percent level or better), which suggests that firms
in industries with low competition have ROE, GAAP_ETR relations that are further away from
zero (more negative), which suggests lower implicit taxes for firms in industries with less
competition.

13,14

I expect similar results regarding the other control variables when ROE is

substituted for PTROE in columns 3 and 4 from Table 6, which I find.

12

In untabulated tests using industry level averages, I find an insignificant correlation between both competition
measures (CR4 and HHI) and capital intensity (CAP) at the industry level. This suggests that after controlling for
industry level competition, capital intensity has a different impact on effective tax rates (GAAP_ETR). I leave
exploration of this effect to future research.
13
In a joint test on the coefficients for ROE, HIGH_COMPAVR and ROExHIGH_COMPVAR, I find that the
relation for the overall sample between ROE and GAAP_ETR is significantly different than zero at the 1 percent or
better level.
14
In a joint test on the coefficients ROE+ROExHIGH_COMPVAR, I find significance at the 1 percent or better
level. This suggests that HIGH_COMPVAR industry firms are able to retain the benefits from tax preferences
through lower implicit taxes.
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iv. Delta Analysis
Next, I calculate implicit taxes following an adapted version of the delta analysis methodology
from Jennings et al. (2012). Implicit taxes are measured as the reduction in explicit tax preference
benefits retained by a firm. This is calculated by setting firm return on equity (ROE) equal to an
equilibrium ROE, after adjusting each for tax preferences with differences between the two
attributable to implicit taxes. I explain this process in more detail in the following paragraphs.
Tax preferences are any tax reduction mechanism that lowers the explicit taxes and therefore
mechanically (absent implicit taxes) increases the after-tax return (ROE). I define tax preferences
(λ) following Jennings et al. (2012) as the rate required to equalize after tax returns (ROE) between
a firm and an equilibrium rate of return, absent implicit taxes. I define firm level after-tax return
as ROE (= pre-tax income less tax expense scaled by beginning of year shareholder’s equity). And
I define equilibrium ROE as ROE*, which is the rate of return all firms earn in the market absent
tax preferences and implicit taxes. Thus,
𝑅𝑂𝐸 = 𝑅𝑂𝐸 ∗ (1 + 𝜆)
I further extend the model to allow equilibrium wide tax preferences. I define equilibrium wide
tax preferences as λ*, such that,
𝑅𝑂𝐸(1 + 𝜆∗ ) = 𝑅𝑂𝐸 ∗ (1 + 𝜆)
However, as discussed previously, implicit taxes reduce the explicit tax benefit retained via a lower
pre-tax return. Thus, I extend the model to include implicit taxes (δ), which are defined as the
reduction in tax preference benefits. And equilibrium implicit taxes are defined as δ*. This leads
to the following model, which considers both implicit taxes and tax preferences,
𝑅𝑂𝐸(1 + 𝜆∗ (1 − δ∗ )) = 𝑅𝑂𝐸 ∗ (1 + 𝜆(1 − δ))
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The equation above models firm level ROE as equal to equilibrium ROE (ROE*) after adjusting
for firm level and equilibrium level implicit taxes and tax preferences. I set equilibrium values
equal to year averages (changing notation from general equilibrium as indicated by * to year
average notation) for each group (high and low competition) as this controls for between group
and year risk differences. Setting the equilibrium as the year-group average diverges from the
Jennings et al. 2012 methodology who set the equilibrium at the industry-year average. I
alternatively set the equilibrium at an industry-year average as I discuss below. Solving for ROE
on the left-hand side results in my main model of interest:
ROE =

[1 + λ(1 − δ)]
̅̅̅̅̅̅
ROEy + ε (3)
[1 + λ̅y (1 − ̅̅̅
δ𝑦 )]

In this model, implicit taxes (δ) are the reduction in explicit tax preference benefits eliminated
through a pre-tax return disadvantage (lower PTROE and thus lower ROE).
Implicit tax theory predicts that implicit taxes will eliminate 100 percent of the explicit tax
preference benefits. The higher the calculated implicit taxes (δ), the more tax preference benefits
are eliminated by implicit taxes. An implicit tax (δ) value of 0 percent would suggest that implicit
taxes do not eliminate any of the explicit tax preference benefits through a return reduction.
Because my hypothesis predicts that I will find lower implicit taxes for firms in industries with
lower competition, realizations of (δ) should decrease with competition.
Using maximum likelihood estimation, I separately estimate implicit taxes (δ) for firms in
high competition (low HHI and CR4) and low competition (high HHI and CR4) industries. Table
7 shows the results of this estimation using the equilibrium set at the year-group average (where
group is defined as above or below median competition measures). In Panel A, I find that for firms
in less competitive industries (high CR4), implicit taxes eliminate 31.18 percent of the explicit tax
preference benefits, while for firms in more competitive industries (low CR4), implicit taxes
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eliminate 62.67 percent of tax preference benefits. And in Table 7, Panel B, when I measure
industry competition with HHI, I find similar results. I find in low competition industries, 28.45
percent of explicit tax preference benefits are eliminated by implicit taxes, and 62.65 percent of
explicit tax preference benefits are eliminated by implicit taxes for firms in high competition
industries.15
Overall, I find that implicit taxes are higher for firms in industries with greater competition
and lower for firms in industries with lower competition. These results are generally consistent
with prior literature on the product demand side from Chyz, Gaertner, and Laplante (2014) and
Kubick et al. 2015 who find that firms selling products with more inelastic demand pass on their
tax avoidance costs less than firms that sell products with more elastic demand and firms with
more individual market power exhibit more tax avoidance behavior.

15

Alternatively, I have calculated delta using the two digit NAICS year averages as the equilibrium. I do not find
confirming results with this analysis, which I attribute to this industry year average equilibrium removing the very
variation among industries I am trying to capture.
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Section IV: Additional Tests
a. Sample Restriction Relaxation and Additional Competition Measures
In this section, I consider relaxing data cuts and using additional competition measures to
determine whether my main results are robust to additional model specifications.
I first relax the assumption that for a firm to be in a high competition (or low competition)
industry it must be in an industry with competition above (or below) the median. I repeat my four
main tests using quartiles instead of above and below median. In this set of tests, I start with my
main sample of firms (n=7,687) and divide the sample into quartiles. Group (1) includes firms in
industries with ≥ 75th percentile of CR4 or HHI, Group (2) includes firms in industries with ≥
50th percentile and < 75th percentile of CR4 or HHI, Group (3) includes firms in industries with
≥ 25th percentile and <50th percentile of CR4 or HHI, and Group (4) includes firms in industries
with <25th percentile of CR4 or HHI. The results for this analysis are shown in Tables 8-11.
Specifically note that each test is reperformed on each quartile sample of firm-years. Thus, for the
PTROE/TAX ratio analysis in Table 8, note that the middle 20% of firms are dropped (just like in
the PTROE/ROE ratio test results shown in Table 4) so that I am comparing the top 40% and the
bottom 40% of the GAAP ETR distribution for each quartile group, which results in a different
sample of firms being dropped than in the median cut tests in Table 4.
Generally I find that my proxies for implicit taxes do not increase monotonically with
competition. The mixed results in this section could be attributable noise in terms of differences
in what competition means across different industries. It is also possible that the mixed results
could be due to misclassified industry competition due to the nature of the variable measurement
– e.g., 4 strong competitors in one industry could provide enough competition for an industry to
be competitive while thousands of firms in another industry each rest in their own niche and do
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not directly compete with one another. Thus, the median tests in the main analysis may have
smoothed out more misclassification issues than the results in this section.
Next I test various additional measures of competition. I introduce three new categories of
competition measures in this section including extended Census data from Jan Keil (Keil 2016),
Gini Coefficient calculations, and Hoberg and Philips’ (Hoberg and Philips 2016, 2010)
calculations of number of competitors. The Census data from Keil is compiled by expanding upon
the electronically available Census data through data requests from the Census. Keil consolidates
into a machine-readable fashion Census data from 1987 through 2012. The Census data is only
available every 5 years, so this represents data from 6 different years. I interpret results I find
using the Keil data with caution; to my knowledge no published paper has used data compiled
from this secondary source.16
The Gini Coefficient data is calculated using Compustat data. The Gini Coefficient was
developed to measure income inequality (Ceriani and Verme 2012, Gini 1912, and Lorenz 1905).
The Gini Coefficient is a value between zero and one with lower values representing more equality
and higher values representing more inequality. The advantage to using the Gini Coefficient as a
measure of competition is that it can be calculated for any year using Compustat data. However,
I hesitate to interpret results using this measure with caution because the Gini Coefficient is
calculated excluding private firms as Compustat only includes public firms. In industries where
private firms make up a significant portion of sales, the Gini Coefficient calculated may be
especially noisy and potentially biased. The Gini Coefficient is generally used as a measure of
income inequality but has been used to measure distribution of a group to apply to various other
situations including wastewater allocation (Sun et al. 2010), export growth (Amiti and Freund

16

https://sites.google.com/site/drjankeil/data
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2010), and source code development (Giger et al. 2011) to name a few. I calculate the Gini
Coefficient for my Compustat sample of firms using the following model at the industry-year level,
where industry is defined in multiple ways using two through five digit NAICS and two through
four digit SIC:

𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 =

100 − 2𝑆
]
𝑛
(4),
100

[100 +

𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒, 𝑆 = 𝑦1 + ⋯ + 𝑦𝑛+1 , 𝑛 =
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑎 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦, 𝑦𝑖 = 100 (
𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑠.

𝑐𝑖
𝑐𝑛+1

) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 + 1, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑖 =
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The Hoberg and Philips (2010, 2016) data uses textual analysis of the 10-K for each firm
and based on products mentioned in the 10-K develops a count of the number of other firms with
similar products mentioned – i.e., number of competitors.18 This data is unique to the other
competition measures used in this paper as it is the only true firm level measure of competition.
However, this data still suffers from only being able to capture public firm measures, and the
measure may be noisy to the extent that this measure does not accurately capture true
competitors. Note that this variable increases with the amount of competition and I have
opposite predictions relative to my other measures of competition.
I show descriptive statistics for this new data summarized in Table 12. Notice that the
alternative competition measures shown in Table 12 have sample sizes (n) that vary and are larger
in many instances than the sample I use in my main analyses. The increased sample size is
potentially a benefit, but the data has limitations as have been previously mentioned.

17
18

http://www.peterrosenmai.com/lorenz-curve-graphing-tool-and-gini-coefficient-calculator.
http://hobergphillips.usc.edu/
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In Table 13, I show the tax ratio analysis test for implicit taxes using a selection of
competition measures including the three digit NAICS and SIC level industry for Keil’s CR4.19
the Gini Coefficient at the three digit NAICS level, and the Hoberg and Philip’s number of
competitors. I select each of these to show a variety of different competition measures. Panels AF show the ratios defining high and low tax using a median split on effective tax rates, while Panels
G-L show the ratios and define high and low tax using the top and bottom 40 percent of the
effective tax rate distribution. I then show the results for both a median split and the top and
bottom quartiles of competition. The median split splits firms into the Low and High competition
groups by splitting at the median of competition, and the quartile splits show the highest versus
lowest quartiles based on competition. The ratio in the last row of each panel represents the portion
of explicit tax benefit that is on average eliminated by a pre-tax return on equity disadvantage.
With the exception of Panels A and G (CR4 at the 3 digit NAICS, SIC using median split), the
other panels show that firms in industries with higher competition bear higher implicit taxes,
evidenced by having more of their explicit tax benefits eliminated by a pre-tax return on equity
disadvantage.
In Table 14, I show the correlation tests for implicit tax differences. In this test, a positive
PTROE, GAAP_ETR correlation represents that as GAAP_ETR decreases, an offsetting PROE
reduction results, which is evidence of implicit taxes. A higher positive PTROE, GAAP_ETR
correlation suggests higher implicit taxes. For the ROE, GAAP_ETR correlations, a correlation
of zero suggests that lowering GAAP_ETR has no effect on after tax return (ROE). A negative
ROE, GAAP_ETR correlation suggests that as a firm lowers its GAAP_ETR, its ROE increases
which indicates they may be able to keep the explicit tax benefits. A correlation close to zero

19

NAICS is used for the Census data from 1997 to the present, and SIC was used prior to 1997.
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between ROE and GAAP_ETR suggests higher implicit taxes, and a more negative correlation
suggests lower implicit taxes. Thus, I expect and find some mixed support for a higher positive
correlation between PTROE and GAAP_ETR and a more negative correlation between ROE and
GAAP_ETR for firms in higher competition industries, which suggests higher competition for
firms in industries with higher competition. Specifically, I do not find support for implicit taxes
being higher for firms in industries with high competition when measuring competition using the
3 digit NAICS and SIC using the CR4 from the Keil data in Table 14, Panels A and B. I find
moderate support in the PTROE, GAAP_ETR correlations for competition measured using the
Gini Coefficients in Table 14, Panels C and D.

And I find moderate support in the PTROE,

GAAP_ETR correlations for competition measured using the Hoberg and Philips number of
competitors’ data in Panels E and F. For the GAAP_ETR, ROE relation, I find mixed results as
well. I find support for higher implicit taxes for higher competition industries when competition
is measured using the Hoberg and Philips number of competitors and when comparing quartiles
only (Panel F).
In Table 15, I show regression results for all of the competition variables listed in the
descriptives in Table 12. Panels A and B of Table 15 shows the regression results for Models (5)
and (6), respectively, below:
𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃_𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑛,𝑦 + 𝛽3 𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑦 𝑥𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑛,𝑦 +
𝛽4 𝐿𝑂𝐺_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽5 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽7 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑦 +𝛽8 𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽9 𝑀𝑁𝐸𝑖,𝑦 +
∑ 𝛽 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑦 + 𝜀 (5)
𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃_𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑛,𝑦 + 𝛽3 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑦 𝑥𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑛,𝑦 +
𝛽4 𝐿𝑂𝐺_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽5 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽7 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑦 +𝛽8 𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑦 + 𝛽9 𝑀𝑁𝐸𝑖,𝑦 +
∑ 𝛽 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑦 + 𝜀 (6)
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Variables are defined in Appendix 1. These models are similar to models (1) and (2) in the main
results of this paper with the exception of how COMPVAR is defined. In these models and the
results in Table 15, COMPVAR is defined using a continuous competition measure, a median split
to define high competition (HIGH_50), the top 25 percent of the competition distribution by year
(High_25), the bottom 25 percent of the competition distribution by year (Low_25), the top 10
percent of the competition distribution by year (High_10), and the bottom 10 percent of the
competition distribution by year (Low_10). Panel A of Table 15 shows the coefficient signs for
Model (5) and Panel B shows the coefficient signs for Model (6). The signs in the Table in the 𝛽1
column show the sign of the coefficient for PTROE in model (5), Panel A and the coefficient for
ROE in in model (6), Panel B. The signs are only shown where significant at the 10 percent or
better level using two tailed tests. The 𝛽3 columns show the signs for the coefficient on the
interaction of PTROE and the CompVar in model (5), Panel A and the coefficient on the interaction
of ROE and the CompVar in model (6), Panel B. The CompVar is defined as a continuous measure
in the CompVar columns and above or below the 50 percent, 25 percent, or 10 percent as indicated
in the other columns. The Competition Variable (CompVar) is defined in the leftmost column in
the Table. In Panel A of Table 15, a positive 𝛽1 coefficient indicates a positive relation between
PTROE and GAAP_ETR, while a negative (positive) 𝛽3 indicates a lower (higher) relation
between PTROE and GAAP_ETR. A positive relation between PTROE and GAAP_ETR suggests
the presence of implicit taxes following the same theory in the correlations section that a positive
relation suggests that as a firm lowers its explicit taxes and GAAP_ETR declines, an offsetting
return via lower PTROE results. Thus, the more positive the relation the higher the implicit taxes
that are suggested. Specifically, in the CompVar column, a negative 𝛽3 indicates that as the
competition variable increases the relation between PTROE and GAAP_ETR declines, and vice

29

versa. For all competition variables with the exception of HP_COMP, as the variable increases,
competition decreases and vice versa. For the HP_COMP variable, as this value increases, the
number of competitors increases which increases the level of competition.

Thus, for the

continuous measure of competition variables, I find support for a lower PTROE, GAAP ETR
relation (lower implicit taxes) for firms as competition decreases using a continuous measure of
competition when competition is measured using a variety of competition measures including
many Keil Census measures (Keil_CR4_2, Keil_CR8_2, Keil_CR4_3, Keil_CR8_3, Keil_CR4_4,
Keil_CR8_4,

Keil_CR4_5,

Keil_CR8_5),

Gini

Coefficient

measures

(GC_NAICS_2,

GC_NAICS_3, GC_SIC_3, GC_SIC_4, GC_NAICS_5), and the Hoberg and Philips measure
(HP_COMP). In the other columns, I look at whether this continuous relation I find in the first
two columns is driven by the extreme quartiles and deciles. The mixed results I find in the other
columns suggest that the linear relation I find in the first two columns may be driven by a linear
relation that exists despite anomalies in the ends of the distribution.
In Panel B, of Table 15, I show the signs of the correlation coefficients for model (6) using
the same set up and competition variable definitions as in Panel A. Following the correlation tests
theory, a negative relation between GAAP_ETR and ROE suggests firms are able to retain explicit
tax savings that are not offset by implicit taxes, and thus a closer to zero relation indicates higher
implicit taxes. I find very little support for implicit taxes varying with competition in Panel B for
the alternate competition measures.
Table 16 shows the estimation of implicit taxes using Model (3) delta analysis. The delta
in these Tables is the measure of implicit taxes, where implicit taxes are measured as the
percentage of explicit tax savings (tax preference benefits) offset by implicit taxes, and thus higher
values indicate higher implicit taxes. I show the results using median and quartile cuts for three
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measures of competition including: Keil’s CR4 at the three digit NAICS and SIC, the Gini
Coefficient at the three digit NAICS, and Hoberg and Philips’ number of competitors. In this
analysis using median cuts (Panels A, C, and E), I only find support for higher competition firms
having higher implicit taxes when competition is measured using CR4 at the three digit NAICS
and SIC in Panel A. Further, I do not find support for a monotonic increase in implicit taxes as
the quartile of competition increases in Panels B, D, and F.
b. Industry Level Tests
As competition in my main set of tests is measured at the industry level, I consider whether
measuring and examining the existence of implicit taxes at the industry-year level as opposed to
the firm-year level impacts the results. In untabulated tests, I find that my main results are
generally supported when implicit taxes are examined at the industry level. All details except for
those specifically mentioned are identical to the main set of comparable tests (i.e., Tables 4-6).
For the PTROE/TAX ratio analysis (similar to Table 4), I find that when competition is measured
using CR4 for the same sample as my main analysis, implicit taxes offset 79.95 percent of the
explicit tax advantage for high competition (low CR4) industries and only 6.30 percent of the
explicit tax advantage for low competition (high CR4) firms. In the correlation tests at the industry
level (similar to Table 5), I find that for industries considered low competition (high CR4), the
PTROE, GAAP_ETR correlation is 15.04 percent and 7.98 percent for high competition (low
CR4) industries, however, the difference is not statistically different, which is likely driven by the
low sample size when using industry-year level measures. And finally, for the regression tests at
the industry-year level (comparable to Table 6, Panel A), and using model (1) at the industry-year
level, I find that the coefficient on the interaction of PTROExHIGH_CR4 (low competition) is
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positive and not statistically significant. The nonexistent results for the regression results here are
likely driven once again by the low sample size in this analysis (n=62 here).
The weakness of my results in these other models suggests that the degree that competition
impacts implicit taxes relies on how competition is measured. Further, my weak results in these
sections may be evidence that the United States has done a good job of preventing monopolies and
price fixing, and the weak and nonexistent results shown in this section may be due to all or most
industries in the United States being competitive enough for implicit taxes to form.
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Section V: Conclusion
In summary, I find that implicit taxes are higher and eliminate more of the explicit tax
preference benefits when markets are more competitive as proxied for by market concentration
ratios and the HHI in my main analysis. That is, when more monopolistic or oligopolistic powers
are present and a few firms can control the market, then implicit taxes are lower and firms are able
to retain more tax preference benefits.
Using four sets of tests, implicit taxes appear to be lower for firms and industries facing lower
competition and vice versa. My results should be of interest to policy makers as tax preferences
allowed in the tax code are meant to promote certain activities. If implicit taxes arise on these tax
preferences, this indicates increased investment in these areas, which is the goal of the policy. If
implicit taxes arise and fully offset the tax preference benefits, then the benefits of the tax
preference may have accrued to the group benefited by the over-investment. However, if implicit
taxes do not fully offset the explicit tax preference benefits, then the benefits of the tax preference
are accruing to the shareholders of the firm, which is likely not the goal of the tax preference
allowed for by Congress. My results should interest firm decision makers as implicit taxes should
be taken into account when making tax related decisions as lowering the explicit tax rate at the
expense of lowering ROE (via implicit taxes) may result when implicit taxes are borne. However,
from the firm’s perspective, in industries with less competition, investing in tax preference benefits
may be extremely beneficial as implicit taxes are lower than in less competitive industries, and
more benefit from investing in tax preferences may be retained by the firm. Further, my results
should be of interest to researchers as most explicit tax research does not consider implicit taxes
and as such, my findings that implicit taxes may vary predictably based on market factors could
alter prior explicit tax findings. Finally, my results should be of interest to the general public who
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may be concerned about firms not paying their share of taxes. If firms are paying lower explicit
taxes but bearing high implicit taxes and potentially benefitting the public (e.g., through increased
R&D) then the public should be unconcerned. However, for firms in less competitive markets
(i.e., firms in more monopolistic type markets), the public’s concern about firms not paying their
fair share of taxes may be warranted as they pay lower explicit taxes and bear low offsetting
implicit taxes.
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APPENDIX 1: Variable Definitions

GAAP_ETRi,y
PTROEi,y
ROEi,y

= tax expense/pretax income (txt/pi)
= pretax income/beginning of year shareholders' equity
= after tax income/beg of year shareholders' equity = (pretax income - tax
expense)/beginning of year shareholders' equity

Total Assetsi,y
Keil_CRX_Y

= total assets (at)
=Concentration Ratio of top X=4 or 8 firms for each industry (as defined by
2,3,4,or 5 digit NAICS or SIC). Note that NAICS is used for 1997-2015, and SIC
is used for 1980-1996 in this sample. And SIC has a maximum of 5 digits. Data is
provided by Jan Keil: https://sites.google.com/site/drjankeil/data

Keil_HHI_Y

=Herfindahl index for each industry (as defined by 2,3,4,or 5 digit NAICS or SIC).
Note that NAICS is used for 1997-2015, and SIC is used for 1980-1996 in this
sample. And SIC has a maximum of 5 digits. Note that data is not provided for
HHI for 2 digit NAICS and SIC. Data is provided by Jan Keil:
https://sites.google.com/site/drjankeil/data
=Gini Coefficient measured using Z=SIC or NAICS, at the Y=2,3,4,or 5 digit
level. The Gini Coefficient (GC) measures inequality, and is calculated as follows:
GC=(100+(100-2S)/n)/100, where n=number of firms, S=sum of yi,
yi=100(ci/cn+1), ci=cumulative revenue (revt) totals after being sorted within each
industry by revenue. (defined http://peterrosenmai.com/lorenz-curve-graphingtool-and-gini-coefficient-calculator)
= number of competitors as defined by Hoberg and Philips. Data is provided by
Hoberg and Philips at: http://hobergphillips.usc.edu/

GC_Z_Y

HP_COMP
CR4n,y
HHIn,y

= top 4 firms' concentration ratio = total revenue (revt) of top 4 firms by NAICS 2
digit year / total sales for industry (Census)
=sum of market share squared by NAICS 2 digit year, where market share=total
revenue (revt)/total sales for industry (Census)
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APPENDIX 2: Supply and Demand Graphs

Figure 1: This figure shows the effect on price of an increase in demand in a perfectly competitive market.

Figure 2: This figure show the effect on price of an increase in supply in a perfectly competitive market.
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Figure 3: This figure shows the effect on price of a shift in the marginal cost in a monopoly. In a
monopoly, the single firm produces at the point at which marginal revenue (MR) equals marginal cost
(MC).

Figure 4: This figure shows the effect on price of a shift in the supply curve when the supplier operates as
a monopoly.

42

Figure 5: This figure shows the effect on price of a shift in the demand curve when the supplier operates
as a monopoly.
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TABLE 1: EFFECT OF SAMPLE SELECTION PROCEDURES ON SAMPLE SIZE
PROCEDURE
1 All U.S. firm-years from 2002, 2007, and 2012 Compustat with nonmissing financial statement information
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Delete firms where ROE is greater than 1
Delete firms where ROE is negative
Delete if tax expense (txt) is negative
Delete if pretax income is negative
Delete if negative stockholders' equity (at-lt)
Delete if total assets (at) < $10 million
Delete if Pretax book income (pi-spi) < $500,000
Delete if Census Industry Sales data unavailable or 0
Total Sample

SAMPLE
13,620
(457)
(3,717)
(898)
(494)
(44)
(151)
(97)
(75)
7,687
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TABLE 2: SAMPLE COMPOSITION BY GENERAL INDUSTRY CATEOGRY
NAICS
Code
33
52
32
22
51
31
42
54
44
21
48
56
72
62
45
53
23
71
61
49
81

Industry Category Description
Manufacturing (e.g., metal, agricultural)
Finance & insurance
Manufacturing (e.g., wood, plastics, rubber)
Utilities
Information
Manufacturing
Wholesale trade
Professional, scientific, & technical services
Retail Trade
Mining, Quarrying, & Oil & Gas Extraction
Transportation & Warehousing
Administrative & support & waste management &
remediation services
Accommodation & food services
Health care & social assistance
Retail Trade
Real estate & rental & leasing
Construction
Arts, entertainment, & recreation
Educational services
Transportation & Warehousing
Other services (except public administration)

HHI
0.0074
0.0003
0.0175
0.0008
0.0009
0.0073
0.0000
0.0001
0.0002
0.0024
0.0004

Number
of FirmCR4
Years
0.1128
1,626
0.0242
1,524
0.2000
657
0.0271
599
0.0503
525
0.1045
371
0.0043
313
0.0119
301
0.0213
294
0.0709
272
0.0273
204

0.0001
0.0001
0.0000
0.0061
0.0000
0.0001
0.0000
0.0001
0.0289
0.0000

0.0142
0.0182
0.0034
0.1098
0.0109
0.0120
0.0032
0.0120
0.3058
0.0018

173
172
157
155
151
51
51
32
31
28
7,687

This table shows the sample composition by 2 digit NAICS. HHI and CR4 are shown as averages of
year HHI and CR4 by 2 digit NAICS.
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TABLE 3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Pane l A: All Firm-ye ars

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Median

n=7,687
GAAP_ETRi,y
0.3210
0.1114
0.3455
ROEi,y
0.1556
0.1255
0.1241
PTROEi,y
0.2312
0.1842
0.1843
CR4n,y
0.0553
0.0825
0.0191
HHIn,y
0.0035
0.0082
0.0001
Total Assetsn,y
5,676.14
16,559.37
876.27
LEVERAGEn,y
0.20
0.18
0.17
CAP n,y
0.25
0.26
0.16
INVn,y
0.10
0.13
0.03
RDn,y
0.02
0.05
MNEn,y
0.44
0.50
Pane l B: High CR4_=0 (High Compe tition firm-ye ars )

Mean
n=3,891
GAAP_ETRi,y
ROEi,y
PTROEi,y
CR4n,y
HHIn,y
Total Assetsn,y
LEVERAGEn,y
CAP n,y
INVn,y
RDn,y
MNEn,y

0.3241
0.1489
0.2234
0.0132
0.0001
6,369.08
0.21
0.23
0.07
0.00
0.27

Standard
Deviation
0.1072
0.1259
0.1870
0.0092
0.0002
18,405.05
0.19
0.27
0.13
0.02
0.44

Median
0.3509
0.1170
0.1745
0.0133
0.0001
1,009.79
0.17
0.08
0.01
-

25th
75th
Percentile Percentile
0.2796
0.0769
0.1122
0.0093
0.0000
253.09
0.04
0.04
0.00
-

0.3812
0.1920
0.2889
0.0585
0.0012
3,226.91
0.32
0.40
0.15
0.01
1.00

25th
75th
Percentile Percentile
0.2842
0.0743
0.1079
0.0039
0.0000
352.90
0.05
0.02
-

0.3840
0.1770
0.2709
0.0188
0.0001
3,506.74
0.33
0.39
0.05
1.00
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TABLE 3 Continued
Panel C: High_CR4_=1 (Low Competition firm-years)

Mean
n=3,796
GAAP_ETRi,y
ROEi,y
PTROEi,y
CR4n,y
HHIn,y
Total Assetsn,y
LEVERAGEn,y
CAP n,y
INVn,y
RDn,y
MNEn,y

0.3178
0.1625
0.2393
0.1317
0.0097
4,965.86
0.20
0.28
0.12
0.04
0.61

Standard
Deviation
0.1155
0.1248
0.1810
0.1006
0.0116
14,392.33
0.17
0.23
0.12
0.06
0.49

Median
0.3396
0.1331
0.1952
0.1029
0.0040
720.98
0.18
0.21
0.10
0.01
1.00

25th
75th
Percentile Percentile
0.2714
0.0797
0.1179
0.0528
0.0010
186.21
0.03
0.10
0.02
-

0.3788
0.2079
0.3059
0.2064
0.0187
2,898.84
0.32
0.40
0.18
0.05
1.00

This table provides descriptive statistics by firm-year except for CR4 and HHI.
CR4 and HHI use values for the 21 industries in the sample. Subscripts i, y, and
n represent firm level, year level, and NAICS (2 digit) industry level
respectively. Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for all firm-years, Panel B
shows the descriptive statistics for firm-years where HIGH_CR4=0, and Panel
C shows the descriptive statistics for firm-years where HIGH_CR4=1.
PTROE, TAX, GAAP_ETR, ROE, TOTAL_ASSETS, LEVERAGE, CAP,
INV, and RD are winsorized at 1% and 99%. Variables are defined in
Appendix 1.
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TABLE 4: PTROE/TAX RATIOS
Panel A: High v. Low CR4
Low Competition
(High CR4)
(n=3,037)
HIGH-TAX (n=3,078)
PTROE Average
TAX Average
LOW-TAX (n=3,071)
PTROE Average
TAX Average
Difference
PTROE
TAX
RATIO (PTROE/TAX)

0.2416
0.0927
(n=1,520)

0.2595
0.0991
(n=1,558)

0.2212
0.0472
(n=1,517)

0.1866
0.0429
(n=1,554)

0.0204 ***
0.0455 ***
0.4484

Panel B: High v. Low HHI
Low Competition
(High HHI)
(n=3,049)
HIGH-TAX (n=3,077)
PTROE
TAX
LOW-TAX (n=3,070)
PTROE
TAX
Difference
PTROE
TAX
RATIO (PTROE/TAX)

High Competition
(Low CR4)
(n=3,112)

Difference

(0.0179) **
(0.0064) **

0.0346 ***
0.0043 **

0.0729 ***
0.0562 ***
1.2976

High Competition
(Low HHI)
(n=3,098)

Difference

0.2350
0.0901
(n=1,526)

0.2632
0.1007
(n=1,551)

(0.0283) ***
(0.0106) ***

0.2200
0.0465
(n=1,523)

0.1891
0.0438
(n=1,547)

0.0309 ***
0.0027

0.0150 **
0.0436 ***
0.3444

0.0741 ***
0.0569 ***
1.3030
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TABLE 4 Continued
This table summarizes the ratios (PTROE/TAX) by above (≥) and below median (<) concentration
ratios (CR4) and Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). HIGH-TAX firms have GAAP_ETRs in the top
40% of the distribution, while LOW-TAX firms have GAAP_ETRs in the bottom 40% of the
distribution. *, **, and*** indicate significance at the better than 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively, using 2-tailed tests. Subscripts i, y, and n represent firm level, year level, and NAICS (2
digit) industry level respectively. PTROE, TAX, GAAP_ETR, ROE, TOTAL_ASSETS, LEVERAGE,
CAP, INV, and RD are winsorized at 1% and 99%. See the Appendix 1 for variable definitions.

Difference
High CR4n,y
High HHIn,y

=high tax PTROE(TAX) - low tax PTROE(TAX)
=1 for firms with ≥median CR4n,y by industry/year
=1 for firms with ≥median HHIn,y by industry/year

Low CR4n,y

=1 for firms with <median CR4n,y by industry/year

Low HHIn,y

=1 for firms with <median HHIn,y by industry/year

PTROEi,y

= pretax income/beginning of year shareholders' equity

TAXi,y

= reduction to ROE caused by explicit taxes = tax expense/beginning of
year shareholders' equity
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TABLE 5: CORRELATIONS
Panel A: High v. Low CR4

PTROEi,y,GAAP_ETRi,y
ROEi,y,GAAP_ETRi,y

Low Competition
(HIGH CR4)
(n=3,796)

High Competition
(LOW CR4)
(n=3,891)

0.0245

0.1063

(0.1551) ***

Difference
***

(0.0819)

***

(0.0509) ***

(0.1042)

***

Panel B: High v. Low
HHI

PTROEi,y,GAAP_ETRi,y
ROEi,y,GAAP_ETRi,y

Low Competition
(HIGH HHI)
(n=3,813)

High Competition
(LOW HHI)
(n=3,874)

0.0223

0.1055

(0.1569) ***

Difference
***

(0.0832)

***

(0.0522) ***

(0.1047)

***

Table 5 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between PTROE and GAAP_ETR as well as for
ROE and GAAP_ETR for firms in industries with low and high competition. *, **, and*** indicate
significance at the at least 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, using 2-tailed tests. Tests of
differences are calculated using z-statistics. Subscripts i, y, and n represent firm level, year level, and
NAICS (2 digit) industry level respectively. PTROE, TAX, GAAP_ETR, and ROE are winsorized at
the 1% and 99% See the Appendix 1 for variable definitions.
High CR4n,y
High HHIn,y
Low CR4n,y
Low HHIn,y

=1 for firms with ≥median CR4n,y by industry/year
=1 for firms with ≥median HHIn,y by industry/year
=1 for firms with <median CR4n,y by industry/year
=1 for firms with <median HHIn,y by industry/year
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TABLE 6: Panel A: REGRESSIONS

Dependent Variable:

VARIABLES:
INTERCEPTi,y
PTROEi,y
HIGH_COMP_VARn,y
PTROEi,y xHIGH_COMP_VARn,y
LOG_ASSETSi,y
LEVERAGEi,y
CAP i,y
INVi,y
RDi,y
MNEi,y
Joint Test:
PTROE+PTROExHIGH_COMP_VAR
Year FE?
Observations
R-squared

(1)
GAAP_ETR
COMP_VAR:
CR4 n,y

(2)
GAAP_ETR
COMP_VAR:
HHIn,y

0.336***
(47.48)
0.0482***
(4.787)
0.00130
(0.255)
-0.0341**
(-2.371)
-0.00174**
-0.0151
(-1.478)
0.0236***
(3.530)
0.0395***
(3.313)
-0.255***
(-6.218)
0.00771**
(2.342)

0.335***
(47.96)
0.0471***
(4.749)
0.000340
(0.0655)
-0.0339**
(-2.344)
-0.00173**
(-2.000)
-0.0150
(-1.469)
0.0249***
(3.573)
0.0414***
(3.447)
-0.254***
(-6.189)
0.00778**
(2.387)

Not Sig.
Yes

Not Sig.
Yes

7,687
0.036

7,687
0.036
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TABLE 6 Continued: Panel B: REGRESSIONS

Dependent Variable:

(3)
GAAP_ETR

(4)
GAAP_ETR

COMP_VAR: COMP_VAR:
CR4n,y
HHIn,y
VARIABLES:
INTERCEPTi,y

-0.00612
(-0.595)
0.0202***
(3.031)
0.0450***
(3.815)
-0.276***
(-6.861)
0.0127***
(3.846)

0.353***
(50.40)
0.00536
(1.025)
-0.0639***
(-3.627)
-0.0820***
(-3.341)
-0.00172**
(-2.018)
-0.00601
(-0.585)
0.0215***
(3.098)
0.0475***
(3.999)
-0.272***
(-6.763)
0.0130***
(3.988)

Joint Test:
ROE+ROExHIGH_COMP_VAR
Year FE?

***
Yes

***
Yes

Observations
R-squared

7,687
0.048

7,687
0.048

HIGH_COMP_VARn,y
ROEi,y
ROEi,y xHIGH_COMP_VARn,y
LOG_ASSETSi,y
LEVERAGEi,y
CAP i,y
INVi,y
RDi,y
MNEi,y

0.353***
(49.81)
0.00661
(1.285)
-0.0634***
(-3.548)
-0.0794***
(-3.235)
-0.00172**
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TABLE 6 Continued
Table 6 shows the coefficient estimates from a regression of GAAP_ETR on the independent
variables listed. Panel A, Columns (1) and (2) use model (1), and columns (3) and (4) use
model (2). Year fixed effects are included and standard errors are clustered by firm. Robust tstatistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively, using 2-sided tests. Subscripts i, y, and n represent firm level, year level,
and NAICS (2 digit) industry level respectively. PTROE, TAX, GAAP_ETR, ROE,
TOTAL_ASSETS, LEVERAGE, CAP, INV, and RD are winsorized at 1% and 99%. See the
Appendix 1 for variable definitions.

COMP_VARn,y
High CR4n,y
High HHIn,y
HIGH_COMP_VARn,y

=CR4n,y or HHIn,y
=1 for firms with ≥median CR4n,y
by industry/year
=1 for firms with ≥median HHIn,y
by industry/year
=HIGH CR4n,y or HIGH HHIn,y

53

TABLE 7: DIRECT ESTIMATION OF IMPLICIT TAXES (NAICS2)
PANEL A: HIGH v. LOW CR4
Low Competition
High Competition

Delta
0.3118
0.6267

Variance of Delta
0.0151
0.0156

n
3,796
3,891

Delta
0.2845
0.6265

Variance of Delta
0.0146
0.0163

n
3,813
3,874

PANEL B: HIGH v. LOW HHI
Low Competition
High Competition

Using Maximum Likelihood Estimation, Table 7 directly estimates the magnitude of implicit taxes
for each group (above and below median CR4) by calculating delta (δ) using model (3) as shown
below. Subscripts i, y, and n represent firm level, year level, and NAICS (2 digit) industry level
respectively. PTROE, TAX, GAAP_ETR, ROE, TOTAL_ASSETS, LEVERAGE, CAP, INV,
and RD are winsorized at 1% and 99%. See the appendix for variable definitions. Panels A and B
set equilibrium values as the group (above or below median competition measures) year averages.

HIGH CR4n,y (HHIn,y ) =1 for firms with ≥median CR4n,y (HHIn,y )by industry/year
LOW CR4n,y (HHIn,y ) =1 for firms with <median HHIn,y (CR4n,y )by industry/year
=group average ROE.
=equilibrium tax rate = year average
T*y
=implicit tax measure as calculated by model (3)
δi,y
=group average δ
=error term
εi,y
=tax preferences = (T*-GAAP_ETR)/(1-T*)
λi,y
=group average λ
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TABLE 8: PTROE/TAX RATIOS (Quartiles)
Panel A: Competion by CR4
(1) Lowest 25%
Competition
(Highest CR4)
HIGH-TAX
PTROE Average
TAX Average
LOW-TAX
PTROE Average
TAX Average
Difference
PTROE
TAX
RATIO (PTROE/TAX)

(2) 25%50%

(3) 50%75%

(4) Highest 75%
Competition
(Lowest CR4)

0.2612
0.1019
(n=746)

0.2444
0.0919
(n=566)

0.2156
0.0858
(n=290)

0.2509
0.0946
(n=1074)

0.2335
0.0584
(n=749)

0.1810
0.0435
(n=568)

0.2246
0.0508
(n=293)

0.2265
0.0466
(n=1077)

0.0277 ***
0.0434 ***
0.6384

0.0634 ***
0.0483 ***
1.3114

(0.0090)
0.0349 ***
(0.2576)

0.0244 ***
0.0481 ***
0.5078

Panel B: Competition by HHI
(1) Lowest 25%
Competition
(Highest HHI )
HIGH-TAX
PTROE Average
TAX Average
LOW-TAX
PTROE Average
TAX Average
Difference
PTROE
TAX
RATIO (PTROE/TAX)

(2) 25%50%

(3) 50%75%

(4) Highest 75%
Competition
(Lowest HHI)

0.2725
0.1057
(n=732)

0.2271
0.0848
(n=734)

0.2190
0.0848
(n=291)

0.2444
0.0928
(n=1117)

0.2421
0.0612
(n=735)

0.1602
0.0347
(n=736)

0.2257
0.0507
(n=293)

0.2211
0.0464
(n=1119)

0.0304 ***
0.0444 ***
0.6837

0.0670 ***
0.0501 ***
1.3372

(0.0068)
0.0341 ***
(0.1987)

0.0233 ***
0.0463 ***
0.5036

55

TABLE 8 Continued
This table summarizes the ratios (PTROE/TAX) by above (≥) and below median (<) concentration
ratios (CR4) and Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). HIGH-TAX firms have GAAP_ETRs in the
top 40% of the distribution, while LOW-TAX firms have GAAP_ETRs in the bottom 40% of the
distribution. *, **, and*** indicate significance at the better than 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively, using 2-tailed tests. Subscripts i, y, and n represent firm level, year level, and NAICS (2
digit) industry level respectively. PTROE, TAX, GAAP_ETR, ROE, TOTAL_ASSETS,
LEVERAGE, CAP, INV, and RD are winsorized at 1% and 99%. See the Appendix 1 for variable
definitions.

Difference
High CR4n,y

=high tax PTROE(TAX) - low tax PTR(TAX)
=1 for firms with ≥median CR4n,y by industry/year

High HHIn,y

=1 for firms with ≥median HHIn,y by industry/year

Low CR4n,y

=1 for firms with <median CR4n,y by industry/year

Low HHIn,y

=1 for firms with <median HHIn,y by industry/year

TAXi,y

= reduction to ROE caused by explicit taxes = tax
expense/beginning of year shareholders' equity
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TABLE 9: CORRELATIONS (Quartiles)
Panel A: High v. Low CR4
(1) Lowest
25%
Competition
(Highest CR4 )

PTROEi,y ,GAAP_ETRi,y
ROEi,y ,GAAP_ETRi,y

0.0321 *
(0.1420) ***

(2) 25%50%

0.0093
(0.1911) ***

(3) 50%75%

0.1559 ***
0.0028

(4) Highest
75%
Competition
(Lowest CR4)

0.0274
(0.1323) ***

Panel B: Competition by HHI
(1) Lowest
25%
Competition
(Highest HHI )

PTROEi,y ,GAAP_ETRi,y
ROEi,y ,GAAP_ETRi,y

0.0315 *
(0.1424) ***

(2) 25%50%

0.0166
(0.1625) ***

(3) 50%75%

0.1468 ***
(0.0104)

(4) Highest
75%
Competition
(Lowest HHI)

0.0370
(0.1233) ***

This table summarizes the ratios (PTROE/TAX) by quartile of the concentration ratios (CR4) and HerfindahlHirschman index (HHI). Group (1) includes firms in industries with ≥ 75th percentile of CR4 or HHI, Group (2)
includes firms in industries with ≥ 50th percentile and < 75th percentile of CR4 or HHI, Group (3) includes
firms in industries with ≥ 25th percentile and <50th percentile of CR4 or HHI, and Group (4) includes firms in
industries with <25th percentile of CR4 or HHI. HIGH-TAX firms have GAAP_ETRs in the top 40% of the
distribution, while LOW-TAX firms have GAAP_ETRs in the bottom 40% of the distribution. *,**,and***
indicate significance at the better than 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, using 2-tailed tests. Subscripts i,
y, and n represent firm level, year level, and NAICS (2 digit) industry level respectively. PTROE, TAX,
GAAP_ETR, ROE, TOTAL_ASSETS, LEVERAGE, CAP, INV, and RD are winsorized at 1% and 99%.
Variables are defined in Appendix 1.

Difference
TAXi,y

=high tax PTR(TAX) - low tax PTR(TAX)
= reduction to ROE caused by explicit taxes = tax expense/beginning of year
shareholders' equity
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TABLE 10: REGRESSIONS (Quartiles)

Dependent Variable:
VARIABLES
Constant
PTR

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

GAAP_ETR
COMP_VAR:
HHIn,y

GAAP_ETR
COMP_VAR:
HHIn,y

GAAP_ETR
COMP_VAR:
CR4n,y

GAAP_ETR
COMP_VAR:
CR4n,y

0.338***
(48.70)
0.0377***
(4.128)

0.358***
(51.47)

0.339***
(48.13)
0.0388***
(4.180)

0.359***
(50.73)

ROE
HIGH_COMP_VAR
PTROExHigh_COMP_VAR

-0.00735
(-1.374)
-0.0179
(-1.189)

ROExHigh_COMP_VAR
LOG_ASSETS
LEVERAGE
CAP
INV
RD
MNE
Year FE?
Observations
R-squared

-0.00189**
(-2.179)
-0.0147
(-1.435)
0.0234***
(3.537)
0.0454***
(3.830)
-0.241***
(-5.860)
0.00873***
(2.690)
Yes
7,687
0.037

-0.0910***
(-5.670)
-0.00634
(-1.177)

-0.0327
(-1.303)
-0.00196**
(-2.283)
-0.00571
(-0.555)
0.0208***
(3.131)
0.0520***
(4.435)
-0.258***
(-6.413)
0.0140***
(4.285)
Yes
7,687
0.047

-0.0112**
(-1.985)
-0.0186
(-1.232)

-0.00209**
(-2.392)
-0.0148
(-1.445)
0.0219***
(3.373)
0.0504***
(4.212)
-0.233***
(-5.715)
0.0104***
(3.132)
Yes
7,687
0.038

-0.0904***
(-5.551)
-0.00973*
(-1.710)

-0.0301
(-1.196)
-0.00214**
(-2.471)
-0.00584
(-0.568)
0.0192***
(2.954)
0.0560***
(4.733)
-0.253***
(-6.332)
0.0154***
(4.595)
Yes
7,687
0.048
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TABLE 10 Continued
High CR4n,y
High HHIn,y

=1 for firms with ≥75th percentile CR4n,y by industry/year
=1 for firms with ≥75th percentile HHIn,y by industry/year

HIGH_COMP_VARn,y

=HIGH CR4n,y or HIGH HHIn,y

This table summarizes the regression results for model (1) in Columns (1) and (2), and model (2) in columns
(3) and (4). Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, and*** indicate significance at the better than 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively, using 2-tailed tests. Subscripts i, y, and n represent firm level, year level, and
NAICS (2 digit) industry level respectively. PTROE, TAX, GAAP_ETR, ROE, TOTAL_ASSETS,
LEVERAGE, CAP, INV, and RD are winsorized at 1% and 99%. See the Appendix 1 for variable definitions.
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TABLE 11: DIRECT ESTIMATION OF IMPLICIT TAXES (Quartiles)
PANEL A: HIGH v. LOW CR4
Delta
(1) Lowest
Competition
(HIGHEST
CR4)
0.3727
(2)
0.2067
(3)
0.8970
(4) Highest
Competition
(LOWEST
CR4)
0.2202

PANEL B: HIGH v. LOW HHI
Delta
(1) Lowest
Competition
(HIGHEST
HHI)
0.3961
(2)
0.3111
(3)
0.7593
(4) Highest
Competition
(LOWEST
HHI)
0.2674

Variance of Delta

n

0.0159
0.0150
0.0134

2,689
729
1,418

0.0175

1,867

Variance of Delta

n

0.0148
0.0149
0.0133

2,794
730
1,837

0.0191

1,833

Using Maximum Likelihood Estimation, Table 11 directly estimates the magnitude of implicit taxes for
each group (above and below median CR4) by calculating delta (δ) using model (3) as shown below.
Subscripts i, y, and n represent firm level, year level, and NAICS (2 digit) industry level respectively.
PTROE, TAX, GAAP_ETR, ROE, TOTAL_ASSETS, LEVERAGE, CAP, INV, and RD are
winsorized at 1% and 99%. Groups (1)-(4) are formed based on CR4 or HHI quartiles by year with (1)
representing the highest quartile CR4 and HHI, and (4) representing the lowest CR4 and HHI. Group
(1) includes firms in industries with ≥ 75th percentile of CR4 or HHI, Group (2) includes firms in
industries with ≥ 50th percentile and < 75th percentile of CR4 or HHI, Group (3) includes firms in
industries with ≥ 25th percentile and <50th percentile of CR4 or HHI, and Group (4) includes firms in
industries with <25th percentile of CR4 or HHI. See Appendix 1 for variable definitions.

60

TABLE 11 Continued

T*y
δi,y
εi,y
λi,y

=Industry average ROE.
=equilibrium tax rate = year average
=implicit tax measure as calculated by model (3)
=industry average δ
=error term
=tax preferences = (T*-GAAP_ETR)/(1-T*)
=industry average λ, where λ is calculated for each FF48 industry, and then
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TABLE 12: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (Additional Competition Measures)

GAAP_ETRi,y
ROEi,y
PTROEi,y
Total Assetsn,y
LEVERAGEn,y
CAP n,y
INVn,y
RDn,y
MNEn,y
Keil_CR4_2
Keil_CR8_2
Keil_CR4_3
Keil_CR8_3
Keil_HHI_3
Keil_CR4_4
Keil_CR8_4
Keil_HHI_4
Keil_CR4_5
Keil_CR8_5
Keil_HHI_5
GC_NAICS_2
GC_NAICS_3
GC_NAICS_4
GC_SIC_2
GC_SIC_3
GC_SIC_4
GC_NAICS_5
HP_COMP

n
Mean
Standard Deviation Median 25th Percentile 75th Percentile
133,290
0.33
0.28
0.36
0.27
0.40
133,290
0.17
0.14
0.13
0.08
0.20
133,290
0.25
0.22
0.20
0.12
0.31
133,290 5,034.12
41,480.39
337.41
64.57
1,635.02
133,281
0.22
0.19
0.20
0.05
0.35
129,669
0.28
0.26
0.20
0.05
0.44
130,437
0.12
0.15
0.05
0.00
0.20
132,948
0.02
0.11
0.01
133,290
0.30
0.46
1.00
22,615
7.17
4.35
6.20
4.20
7.40
22,615
11.37
6.54
9.90
6.80
11.80
22,840
13.07
11.00
8.90
6.30
18.00
22,840
19.22
14.33
14.70
9.90
26.20
4,620
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
22,931
26.80
14.36
20.80
18.10
38.80
22,931
34.94
16.30
31.60
23.80
48.10
4,784
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.01
0.05
15,164
28.26
14.34
25.60
17.70
34.30
15,163
38.49
16.97
35.80
26.40
47.90
4,768
0.05
0.04
0.04
0.02
0.06
131,598
0.85
0.08
0.89
0.81
0.90
131,512
0.80
0.11
0.82
0.73
0.90
130,160
0.76
0.14
0.77
0.67
0.88
133,290
0.81
0.10
0.84
0.74
0.90
133,290
0.76
0.14
0.77
0.67
0.87
133,288
0.72
0.15
0.73
0.62
0.83
124,770
0.72
0.18
0.74
0.62
0.86
59,348
146.42
204.67
54.00
16.00
165.00

Table 12 provides descriptive statistics by firm-year See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. This data
includes firm-year data for years 1980-2015 with data requirements (1)-(7) from Table (1) applied
excluding the 2002, 2007, and 2012 fiscal year requirement. Each competition variable (all variables listed
in this table except for GAAP_ETR, ROE, PTROE, and Total Assets) have specific data limitations.
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TABLE 13: PTROE/TAX RATIOS (Additional Competition Measures)
Panel A: High v. Low CR4 (NAICS 3 and SIC 3) (median split)
Low Competition
(High CR4)

High Competition
(Low CR4)
Difference

HIGH-TAX (Top 50%)
PTROE Average
TAX Average
LOW-TAX (Bottom 50%)
PTROE Average
TAX Average
Difference
PTROE
TAX
RATIO (PTROE/TAX)

0.2839
0.1164
(n=8005)

0.2778
0.1071
(n=3418)

0.2185
0.0541
(n=8002)

0.2294
0.0539
(n=3415)

0.0654 ***
0.0623 ***
1.0492

0.0061
0.0093 ***

(0.0109)
0.0002

0.0484 ***
0.0532 ***
0.9097

Panel B: High v. Low CR4 (NAICS 3 and SIC 3) (Quartiles)
Low Competition
(High CR4)

High Competition
(Low CR4)
Difference

HIGH-TAX (Top 50%)
PTROE Average
TAX Average
LOW-TAX (Bottom 50%)
PTROE Average
TAX Average
Difference
PTROE
TAX
RATIO (PTROE/TAX)

0.2916
0.1217
(n=6313)

0.2992
0.1156
(n=1388)

0.2218
0.0564
(n=6309)

0.2190
0.0495
(n=1386)

0.0698 ***
0.0653 ***
1.0683

(0.0076)
0.0061 **

0.0029
0.0069 ***

0.0803 ***
0.0661 ***
1.2150

63

TABLE 13 Continued
Panel C: High v. Low Gini Coefficient (GC) (NAICS 3) (median split)
Low Competition
(High GC)

High Competition
(Low GC)
Difference

HIGH-TAX (Top 50%)
PTROE Average
TAX Average
LOW-TAX (Bottom 50%)
PTROE Average
TAX Average
Difference
PTROE
TAX
RATIO (PTROE/TAX)

0.2903
0.1173
(n=33512)

0.2839
0.1158
(n=32266)

0.0063 ***
0.0015 **

0.2221
0.0526
(n=33490)

0.2155
0.0533
(n= 32244)

0.0066 ***
(0.0007)

0.0682 ***
0.0647 ***
1.0538

0.0684 ***
0.0625 ***
1.0944

Panel D: High v. Low Gini Coefficient (NAICS 3) (Quartiles)
Low Competition
(High GC)

High Competition
(Low GC)
Difference

HIGH-TAX (Top 50%)
PTROE Average
TAX Average
LOW-TAX (Bottom 50%)
PTROE Average
TAX Average
Difference
PTROE Average
TAX
RATIO (PTROE/TAX)

0.2799
0.1124
(n=18835)

0.2783
0.1139
(n=15809)

0.0016
(0.0015)

0.2111
0.0509
(n=18811)

0.2025
0.0525
(n=15790)

0.0085 ***
(0.0017)

0.0688 ***
0.0616 ***
1.1183

0.0758 ***
0.0614 ***
1.2340
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TABLE 13 Continued
Panel E: High v. Low Number of Competitors (Hoberg and Philips) (median split)
Low Competition
(Low Number of
Competitors)

High Competition
(High Number of
Competitors)
Difference

HIGH-TAX (Top 50%)
PTROE Average
TAX Average
LOW-TAX (Bottom 50%)
PTROE Average
TAX Average
Difference
PTROE
TAX
RATIO (PTROE/TAX)

0.2749
0.1063
(n=14773)

0.2475
0.0645
(n=14912)

0.0274
0.0418

0.2504
0.0646
(n=14760)

0.1844
0.0368
(n=14903)

0.0660
0.0278

0.0245 ***
0.0417 ***
0.5884

0.0631 ***
0.0277 ***
2.2806

Panel F: High v. Low Number of Competitors (Hoberg and Philips) (Quartiles)
Low Competition
(Low Number of
Competitors)

High Competition
(High Number of
Competitors)
Difference

HIGH-TAX (Top 50%)
PTROE Average
TAX Average
LOW-TAX (Bottom 50%)
PTROE Average
TAX Average
Difference
PTROE
TAX
RATIO (PTROE/TAX)

0.2729
0.1055
(n=7231)

0.2166
0.0791
(n=7438)

0.0563
0.0264

0.2549
0.0676
(n=7221)

0.1760
0.0370
(n=7427)

0.0789
0.0307

0.0180 ***
0.0379 ***
0.4761

0.0406 ***
0.0421 ***
0.9649
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TABLE 13 Continued
Panel G: High v. Low CR4 (NAICS 3 and SIC 3) (median split)
Low Competition
(High CR4)

High Competition
(Low CR4)
Difference

HIGH-TAX
(Top 40%)
PTROE Average
TAX Average
LOW-TAX
(Bottom 40%)
PTROE Average
TAX Average

0.2865
0.1201
(n=6405)

0.2800
0.1098
(n=2734)

0.0065
0.0103

0.2083
0.0450
(n=6401)

0.2175
0.0443
(n=2732)

(0.0092)
0.0007

***

Difference
PTROE

0.0782

***

0.0625

***

TAX
RATIO
(PTROE/TAX)

0.0751

***

0.0655

***

1.0406

0.9532

Panel H: High v. Low CR4 (NAICS 3 and SIC 3) (Quartiles)
Low Competition
(High CR4)

High Competition
(Low CR4)
Difference

HIGH-TAX
(Top 40%)
PTROE Average
TAX Average
LOW-TAX
(Bottom 40%)
PTROE Average
TAX Average

0.2928
0.1250
(n=5047)

0.2974
0.1167
(n=1112)

(0.0046)
0.0083

**

0.2087
0.0462
(n=5052)

0.2027
0.0375
(n=1108)

0.0059
0.0086

***

Difference
PTROE

0.0842

***

0.0947

***

TAX
RATIO
(PTROE/TAX)

0.0788

***

0.0792

***

1.0678

1.1961
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TABLE 13 Continued
Panel I: High v. Low Gini Coefficient (GC) (NAICS 3) (median split)
Low Competition
(High GC)
HIGH-TAX
(Top 40%)
PTROE Average
TAX Average
LOW-TAX
(Bottom 40%)
PTROE Average
TAX Average

High Competition
(Low GC)

Difference

0.2931
0.1215
(n=26816)

0.2855
0.1188
(n=25819)

0.0076
0.0027

***
***

0.2134
0.0437
(n=26785)

0.2055
0.0438
(n=25791)

0.0079
(0.0001)

***

Difference
PTROE

0.0797

***

0.0800

***

TAX
RATIO
(PTROE/TAX)

0.0777

***

0.0749

***

1.0252

1.0675

Panel J: High v. Low Gini Coefficient (NAICS 3) (Quartiles)
Low Competition
(High GC)
HIGH-TAX
(Top 40%)
PTROE Average
TAX Average
LOW-TAX
(Bottom 40%)
PTROE Average
TAX Average

High Competition
(Low GC)

Difference

0.2834
0.1165
(n=15071)

0.2810
0.1169
(n=12655)

0.0024
(0.0004)

0.2031
0.0428
(n=15046)

0.1915
0.0433
(n=12624)

0.0115
(0.0005)

***

Difference
PTROE
TAX
RATIO
(PTROE/TAX)

0.0803
0.0737
1.0897

***
***

0.0894
0.0736

***
***

1.2155
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TABLE 13 Continued
Panel K: High v. Low Number of Competitors (Hoberg and Philips) (median split)
Low Competition
High Competition
(Low Number of
(High Number of
Competitors)
Competitors)
Difference
HIGH-TAX (Top 40%)
PTROE Average
TAX Average
LOW-TAX (Bottom 40%)
PTROE Average
TAX Average
Difference
PTROE
TAX
RATIO (PTROE/TAX)

0.2715
0.1071
(n=11824)

0.2540
0.0968
(n=11934)

0.0174
0.0103

0.2415
0.0563
(n=11806)

0.1788
0.0300
(n=11918)

0.0627
0.0263

0.0300
0.0508
0.5899

***
***

0.0752 ***
0.0668 ***
1.1268

Panel L: High v. Low Number of Competitors (Hoberg and Philips) (Quartiles)
Low Competition
High Competition
(Low Number of
(High Number of
Competitors)
Competitors)
Difference
HIGH-TAX (Top 40%)
PTROE Average
TAX Average
LOW-TAX (Bottom 40%)
PTROE Average
TAX Average
Difference
PTROE
TAX
RATIO (PTROE/TAX)

0.2685
0.1059
(n=5790)

0.2226
0.0832
(n=5954)

0.0458
0.0228

0.2446
0.0591
(n=5775)

0.1726
0.0318
(n=5939 )

0.0719
0.0273

0.0239
0.0468
0.5111

***
***

0.0500 ***
0.0514 ***
0.9730
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TABLE 14: CORRELATIONS (Additional Competition Measures)
Panel A: High v. Low CR4 (NAICS 3 and SIC 3) (median split)
Low Competition
High Competition
(HIGH CR4)
(LOW CR4)
(n=16007)
(n=6833)
Difference
PTROEi,y ,GAAP_ETRi,y
0.0930 ***
0.0199 *
0.0731 ***
ROEi,y ,GAAP_ETRi,y
(0.0410) ***
(0.0080)
(0.0330) **
Panel B: High v. Low CR4 (NAICS 3 and SIC 3) (Quartiles)
Low Competition
High Competition
(HIGH CR4)
(LOW CR4)
(n=12622)
(n=2774)
Difference
PTROEi,y ,GAAP_ETRi,y
0.1016 ***
0.2149 *** (0.1133) ***
ROEi,y ,GAAP_ETRi,y
(0.0357) ***
0.0277
(0.0634)

Panel C: High v. Low Gini Coefficient (GC) (NAICS 3) (median split)
Low Competition
High Competition
(HIGH GC)
(LOW GC)
(n=67002)
(n=64510)
PTROEi,y ,GAAP_ETRi,y
0.0515 ***
0.0788
ROEi,y ,GAAP_ETRi,y
(0.0148) ***
(0.0191)
Panel D: High v. Low Gini Coefficient (NAICS 3) (Quartiles)
Low Competition
High Competition
(HIGH GC)
(LOW GC)
(n=37646)
(n=31599)
PTROEi,y ,GAAP_ETRi,y
0.1019 ***
0.1183
ROEi,y ,GAAP_ETRi,y
(0.0188) ***
0.0205

Difference
*** (0.0273) ***
***
0.0043

Difference
*** (0.0164) **
*** (0.0393)

Panel E: High v. Low Number of Competitors (Hoberg and Philips) (median split)
High
Low Competition
Competition
(Low Number of
(High Number of
Competitors)
Competitors)
(n=29533)
(n=29815)
Difference
PTROEi,y ,GAAP_ETRi,y
(0.0024)
0.0968 *** (0.0992) ***
ROEi,y ,GAAP_ETRi,y
(0.0273) ***
(0.0129) **
(0.0144) *
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TABLE 14 Continued
Panel F: High v. Low Number of Competitors (Hoberg and Philips) (Quartiles)
Low Competition
High Competition
(Low Number of
(High Number of
Competitors)
Competitors)
(n=14452)
(n=14865)
Difference
PTROEi,y ,GAAP_ETRi,y
(0.0114)
0.0543 *** (0.0657) ***
ROEi,y ,GAAP_ETRi,y
(0.0131)
(0.0318) ***
0.0187

This table shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between PTROE and GAAP_ETR as well as
for ROE and GAAP_ETR for firms in industries with low and high competition. *,**,and*** indicate
significance at the at least 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, using 2-tailed tests. High and low
competition groups are determined by a median split for each competition measure each year. Tests
of differences are calculated using z-statistics. Subscripts i, y, and n represent firm level, year level,
and NAICS (2 digit) industry level respectively. PTROE, TAX, GAAP_ETR, ROE, TOTAL
ASSETS, LEVERAGE, CAP, INV, and RD are winsorized at the 1% and 99%. See Appendix 1 for
variable definitions.
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TABLE 15: SUMMARY OF REGRESSION TESTS (Additional Competition Measures)
Panel A: PTROE, ETR Regressions
Comp Vars:
CompVar High_50
B1 B3 B1 B3
Keil_CR4_2
+
Keil_CR8_2
+
Keil_CR4_3
+
+
Keil_CR8_3
+
+
Keil_HHI_3
Keil_CR4_4
+
+
Keil_CR8_4
+
+
Keil_HHI_4
Keil_CR4_5
+
+
Keil_CR8_5
+
+
Keil_HHI_5
GC_NAICS_2
+
+
GC_NAICS_3
+
+
GC_NAICS_4
+
+
+
GC_SIC_2
+
GC_SIC_3
+
+
+
GC_SIC_4
+
+
+
GC_NAICS_5
+
+
+
HP_COMP
+
+

High_25
B1 B3
+
+
+
+
+

+

+
+
+
+
+
+
+

Low_25
B1 B3
+
+
+
+
+
+

-

+
+
+
+
+

High_10
B1 B3
+
+
+
+

Low_10
B1 B3
+
+
+
+
+

+
+

+
+

+

+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

-

+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

+
+
+
+
+

-
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TABLE 15 Continued
Panel B: ROE, ETR Regressions
Comp Vars:
CompVar
High_50
B1
B3
B1
B3
Keil_CR4_2
Keil_CR8_2
Keil_CR4_3
Keil_CR8_3
Keil_HHI_3
Keil_CR4_4
Keil_CR8_4
Keil_HHI_4
Keil_CR4_5
Keil_CR8_5
Keil_HHI_5
GC_NAICS_2
GC_NAICS_3 +
GC_NAICS_4
+
GC_SIC_2
GC_SIC_3
+
+
GC_SIC_4
+
+
GC_NAICS_5
+
HP_COMP
-

High_25
B1
B3
-

+

+
+
+
+

Low_25
B1
B3
-

High_10
B1
B3
-

-

-

-

-

-

+

+

+

+
+
+
+

Low_10
B1
B3
-

+
+
+
-

This table summarizes the regression results for multiple regressions. Regressions in Panel A use
model (1), and regressions in Panel B use model (2), where HIGH_COMPVAR is substituted for a
continuous measure (CompVar), a greater than or equal to median dummy variable for competition
(High_50), a greater than or equal to top 25% dummy variable for competition (High_25), a less
than 25% dummy variable for competition (Low_25), a greater than or equal to top 10% dummy
variable for competition (High_10), and a less than 10% dummy variable for competition (Low_10).
CompVar defines the competition variables as: Keil_CR4_X, Keil_CR8_X, Keil_HHI_X,
GC_NAICS_X, and GC_SIC_X, where X=1,2,3,4,or 5. This table shows the coefficient signs on
the variables of interest. The B 1 columns in Panel A and B show the sign of the coefficient on
PTROE and ROE in models (1) and (2) respectively. The B 3 column shows the sign of the
interacted variable PTROE or ROE and the CompVar in models(5) and (6) respectively. + and represent a positive or negative, respectively, coefficient at the at least 10% two-tailed level of
significance. Note that all competition measures in this table with the exception of HP_COMP,
higher values indicate lower competition. See Appendix 1 for variable definitions.
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TABLE 16: DIRECT ESTIMATION OF IMPLICIT TAXES (Additional Competition Measures)
PANEL A: HIGH v. LOW CR4 (NAICS3 and SIC3) (<50%,>=50%)
Delta
Variance of Delta
n
Low Competition
0.7673
0.0177
16,007
High Competition
0.9795
0.0183
6,833
PANEL B: CR4 Low to High Competition (NAICS3 and SIC3) (25% groups)
Delta
Variance of Delta
n
Lowest Competition
0.7578
0.0184
12,622
(25-50%)
0.8391
0.0174
2,225
(50-75%)
0.9891
0.0172
4,059
Highest Competition
0.4267
0.0196
2,774
PANEL C: HIGH v. LOW Gini Coefficient (GC) (NAICS 3) (<50%,>=50%)
Delta
Variance of Delta
n
Low Competition
0.9591
0.0184
67,002
High Competition
0.8718
0.0157
64,510
PANEL D: Gini Coefficient (NAICS 3) Low to High Competition (25% groups)
Delta
Variance of Delta
n
Lowest Competition
0.8896
0.0166
37,646
(25-50%)
0.9742
0.0207
27,119
(50-75%)
0.8631
0.0176
32,911
Highest Competition
0.8899
0.0137
31,599
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TABLE 16 Continued
PANEL E: HIGH v. LOW Number of Competitiors (Hoberg and Philips)
Delta
Variance of Delta
n
Low Competition
0.9683
0.0172
29,533
High Competition
0.8964
0.0123
29,815
PANEL F: Number of Competitors (Hoberg and Philips) Low to High Competition
Delta
Variance of Delta
n
Lowest Competition
0.9894
0.0175
14,452
(25-50%)
0.8159
0.0169
15,081
(50-75%)
0.7099
0.0152
14,680
Highest Competition
0.9566
0.0093
14,865

Using Maximum Likelihood Estimation, this table directly estimates the magnitude of implicit
taxes for each group (above and below median competition measures, and groups by quartile) by
calculating delta (δ) using model (3) as shown below. Groups (1)-(4) are formed based on
competition measure quartiles by year with (1) representing the highest quartile competition
variable, and (4) representing the lowest competition variable. Group (1) includes firms in
industries with ≥ 75th percentile of the competition variable, Group (2) includes firms in industries
with ≥ 50th percentile and < 75th percentile of the competition variable, Group (3) includes firms
in industries with ≥ 25th percentile and <50th percentile of the competition variable, and Group (4)
includes firms in industries with <25th percentile of the competition variable. See appendix for
variable definitions.Subscripts i, y, and n represent firm level, year level, and industry level
respectively. PTROE, TAX, GAAP_ETR, ROE, TOTAL_ASSETS, LEVERAGE, CAP, INV,
and RD are winsorized at 1% and 99%. See Appendix 1 for variable definitions.

T*y
δi,y
εi,y
λi,y

=Industry average ROE.
=equilibrium tax rate = year average
=implicit tax measure as calculated by model (3)
=industry average δ
=error term
=tax preferences = (T*-GAAP_ETR)/(1-T*)
=industry average λ, where λ is calculated for each FF48 industry, and then
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